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Angry White Males:
The Equal Protection Clause
and "Classes of One"
BY TIMOTHY ZICK"
"'Equal protection' emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State
between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably mdistin-
guishable."'
"[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect
persons, not groups."2
I. INTRODUCTION
etion 1 of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides, m part, that "[n]o state shall. deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
Trial Attorney, Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice. J.D. 1992, Georgetown Umversity Law Center. The
opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not represent the
position of the United States Department of Justice as to any matter. The author
would like to thank Colin Owyang and Rupa Bhattacharyya for their assistance,
and Madeleine Tinm for reviewing earlier drafts of tns Article.
I Ross v Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) (emphasis added). In Ross, the
Supreme Court refused to find that the Equal Protection Clause mandated an
extension of the rule requmng states to appoint counsel for indigent defendants for
appeals as of right to discretionary state court appeals or appeals to the federal
courts. Id. at 617-18.
2 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). InAdarand,
the Supreme Court struck down an affirmative action scheme providing financial
incentives to prime contractors who hired subcontractors from certain minority
groups, finding that the scheme violated equal protection. Id. The Court noted that
"all governmental action based on race should be subjected to detailed judicial
inquiry to ensure that thepersonal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed." Id. See also infra note 224 and accompanying text.
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laws."3 Once considered "the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments," the Equal Protection Clause has become "the Court's chief
instrument for invalidating state laws."5 Unfortunately, however, as
Professor-Tribe has noted, "[t]he words of the equal protection clause do
not, by themselves, tell us as much as we might wish."6 Nor does adverting
to the original intentions of the fiamers of the Equal Protection Clause
provide much guidance, at least as to specific issues. The "original
understanding" of the meaning of "equal protection" continues to be the
subject of active scholarly debate, and any effort to glean answers to
specific questions from the ambiguous ratification debates is bound to lead
to frustration.
7
As the Constitution and history offer little guidance as to the substan-
tive meaning of "equal protection," it has fallen to the Supreme Court to
flesh out a doctrine.8 From the beginning, the Court has struggled to
provide a coherent framework within which to analyze challenges to
governmental action brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.
From its original requirement that legislative classifications merely be
3 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
5 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
6 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrrUTIONAL LAW 1514 (2d ed. 1988).
As Professor Tribe has stated: "To declare that no state shall 'deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws' is more to proclaim a
delpluc edict than to state an intelligible rule of decision." Id.
' Compare Howard J. Graham, Our "Declaratory"Fourteenth Amendment, 7
STAN. L. REV 3, 9-10, 17, 23, 37 (1954), and Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth
Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1049,
1054-85 (1956), and John P Frank & Robert F Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection ofthe Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421,442-
43 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to eradicate all racial
distinctions), with RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 18-19, 22-23,
163-65, 169, 173, 239 (1977), and MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF
PRINCIPLE 170 (1974), andAlexanderM. Bickel, The Original Understanding and
the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L.REV 1, 12-13, 16-17,46-47,56-58 (1955)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily intended to
constitutionalize the 1866 Civil Rights Act and to prohibit racial discrimination
with regard to particular fundamental rights only). For a summary ofthis and other
scholarship, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 2-3,63,123
(1988).
' See NELSON, supra note 7, at 148-96. Originally, it was anticipated that
Congress, not federal judges, would be enforcing the Fouiteenth Amendment See
Cass R. Sunstem, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv 2410, 2439 (1994).
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"reasonable," the Court has groped gradually toward its current analytical
framework under which three (and perhaps more) levels of scrutiny may
apply, depending primarily upon the nature of the group or class allegedly
discriminated agamstf The current multi-tiered approach aims principally
to separate permissible legislative generalizations based upon group
characteristics from illegitimate generalizations based upon stereotypes or
other impermissible criteria.0
Notwithstanding the active debate concerning the original purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause, it is widely accepted that the principal aim of
the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eradicate
official antebellum discrimination against blacks, particularly the so-called
"Black Codes," pursuant to which blacks were treated as a lower or second-
class caste."I Although not part of the framers' original design, the Supreme
9 The Court's original conception of "reasonableness" held that no regulatory
provision was repugnant to equal protection so long as it "place[d] under the same
restrictions, and subject[ed] to like penalties and burdens, all who [were]
embraced by its prohibitions." Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888).
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's current multi-tiered approach to equal
protection, see 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 4-66 (2d ed. 1992). Some commentators have argued that
in addition to the three commonly used standards of review-rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny-the Supreme Court has on occasion
applied a fourth standard, sometimes called "rational basis with teeth." See, e.g.,
Gale Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basts With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny byAny Other
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987). At least one Justice contends that there exists only
one standard ofreview under the Equal Protection Clause. See City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,452-53 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Court is actually applying a single rational basis standard in all of
its equal protection cases).
" See ROTUNDA &NOWAK, supra note 9, at 568 ("[Ihe court has increasingly
focused upon the concept of equal protection to guarantee that all individuals are
accorded fair treatment in the exercise of fundamental rights or the elimination of
distinctions based on inpermissible criteria."); see Shannon Dean Sexton, Note, A
Custody System Free of Gender Preferences and Consistent with the Best Interests
ofthe Child: Suggestionsfor a More Protective and Equitable Custody System, 88
KY. L.J. 761, 784 n.172 (2000) (highlighting illegitimate legislative generalizations
based upon inpermissible gender stereotypes or other unpermissible criteria m the
child custody context).
" See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 934 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[T]he driving force behind the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
desire to end legal discrimination against blacks."); Strauderv West Virgnia, 100
U.S. 303, 310 (1879) ("[The Fourteenth Amendment's] aim was against
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Court long ago expanded the right of equal protection to groups other than
racial minorities." Classifications based upon gender and alienage, for
example, now receive some form of "heightened" scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Yet while the composition of the challenged
class has shifted from time to time, the conceptualization of equal
protection as a safeguard against disparate treatment of classes of
individuals whose situations are allegedly indistinguishable has remained
the core principle.'4 Indeed, inthe Court's recent Terms, interclass conflicts
such as affirmative action, legislative districting, single-sex military
education, and anti-gay legislation have dominated the equal protection
docket.' s
discrimination because of race or color."); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) ("The existence of laws in the States where the newly
emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by tins [equal
protection] clause, and by it such laws are forbidden."). See John Harison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE LJ. 1385, 1413
(1992), for an explanation of how Black Codes were used to prevent blacks from
enjoying a wide variety of social and legal privileges available to whites.
12 The Supreme Court has never felt particularly constrained to adhere strictly
to the original understanding of the framers of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed,
by the 1960s, only Justice John Marshall Harlan continued to evince serious
concern with the Fourteenth Amendment's original understanding. See Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As one
scholar has noted, the Court in the 1970s "scarcely batted a collective eyelash at
extending meaningful equal protection review to groups-women, aliens, and
nonmarital children-plainly not among the contemplated beneficianes of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History ofModern
EqualProtection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213,254 (1991). InProfessorKlarman's view,
the Justices have generally shown "virtual contempt for the integrity of the
historical record." Id. at 253.
,3 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender
must serve inportant goverimental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376
(1971) (invalidating state statutes denying welfare benefits to resident aliens).
"I In fact, many racists during the ratification debates agreed with thins core
principle. However, these same individuals attempted to circumvent this principle
behind the Equal Protection Clause by arguing that blacks "were something less
than the full equals of whites." See NELsON, supra note 7, at 96-97
Is See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (discussing single-sex
military education); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (discussing racial
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The text of the Equal Protection Clause speaks not of classes or groups,
but of "persons."16 Does the clause protect persons qua persons, or only as
members of identifiable classes or groups? Is the Equal Protection Clause
concerned with allegations of individual mistreatment at all? While most
courts and scholars have interpreted the clause as a protection against group
mistreatment, in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,7 a little-noticed per
cunam opinion, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
maybe invoked to challenge individual claims ofmistreatment at the hands
of government officials.' s Olech involved a plaintiff who challenged the
decision of local officials to require a thirty-three foot easement as a
condition of connecting property to the municipal water system, while
requinng only a fifteen foot easement from other property owners.' 9 The
Court treated the question presented-whether a "class of one" singled out
for allegedly arbitrary or capricious treatment may bring a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause-as having been plainly decided by its prior
precedents."
With the exception of Justice Breyer, who wrote a brief concurrng
opinion,2 the Court brushed aside concerns that had been expressed even
by Chief Judge Posner, who authored the Olech opinion in the Seventh
Circuit, that expanding the Equal Protection Clause to cover individual
claims of mistreatment would flood the federal courts with local disputes
between citizens and government officials.?
Prior to Olech, a split among the federal courts of appeals and, indeed, a
split within one of those circuits, had developed concerning the viability of
"class of one" equal protection clauns? The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit expressly held in a trilogy of cases, most recently in
Olech, that an individual, regardless of race, gender, ethncity, or any other
distinguihing group characteristic, who alleged that a government official
treated him adversely compared to others similarly situated, due solely to an
gerrymandering); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (discussing anti-
discrimination protections for homosexuals); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995) (discussing affirmative action).
16 US. CONST. amend. XIV
'7Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curam).
'8 Id. at 1074-75.
19 Id. at 1074.20 Id at 1074-75.
211d. at 1075.
" Id. For a discussion of Chief Judge Posner's concerns, see infra note 73 and
accompanying text.
' See infra Parts H.A-B.
2000-2001]
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"illegitimate animus," could bring a claim pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.24 Just prior to Olech, however, the
Seventh Circuit held exactlythe opposite. In a series of opimons, the Seventh
Circuit held that "[d]iscrnnation based merely on individual, rather than
group, reasons will not suffice" to state a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause3l The Sixth Circuit had also held that so-called "classes of one" are
not entitled to bring an equal protection claim.26 Relyingprincipallyupon the
Supreme Court's equal protection "selective prosecution" case law, which
requires that a plaintiff clami either membership m a protected group or
violation ofan independent constitutionalnghtto mvoketheEqualProtection
Clause, the Sixth Circuit hadheldthat "classes ofone" who allege illegitimate
animus but who are not singled out because of membership m a protected
group or because of retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right do not have a viable cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause.2 7
24 See Olechv. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), aff'dper
cunain, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000); Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v Indianapolis Bd.
of Sch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d 1179 (7th Cir. 1996); Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176
(7th Cir. 1995). The First and Second Circuits have also held that the Equal
Protection Clause protects an individual from a state official who selectively
enforces a law or regulation out of sheer malice. See Crowley v. Courville, 76 F.3d
47,52-53 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be based
upon group membership, the exercise of fundamental rights, or "malicious or bad
faith intent to injure a person"); Rubmovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 911 (1st Cir.
1995) (allowing selective enforcement claim based upon "bad faith or malicious
intent to injure," but noting that successful claims should be "infrequent").
I New Burnham Prame Homes, Inc. v. Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th
Cir. 1990). See also Herro v. City of Milwaukee, 44 F.3d 550, 552-53 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that personal vendettas against individuals are not actionable under
the Equal Protection Clause); Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d343,348 (7thCir. 1992),
affd, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (holding that "'the state's act of singling out an
individual for differential treatment' does not'itselfcreate the class"' necessary for
application of the Equal Protection Clause (quoting Wroblewsla v. City of
Washburn, 965 F.2d 452,459 (7th Cir. 1992)); Smith v. Town of Eaton, 910 F.2d
1469, 1472 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting equal protection claim because plaintiff did
notallege class-baseddiscrimnation); Huebschenv. Dep'tofHealth & Soc. Servs.,
716 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that equal protection claim must be
based on "intentional discrimination against [the plaintiff] because of his
membersip in a particular class, not merely [because] he was treated unfairly as
an individual").
26 Futermck v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996).
27 Id. at 1057 In Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff may state a claim for selective prosecution under the
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In Olech, the Supreme Courtput aside the Seventh Circuit's "vindictive
action" theory and held that a plaintiff need not allege subjective "bad
faith," "illegitimate animus," or intent to injure in order to challenge a local
official's conduct under the Equal Protection Clause.28 The Court held that
under its precedents, all that is required to invoke the Equal Protection
Clause is that a plaintiff allege arbitrary treatment, as measured against
others similarly situated.29 The Supreme Court's holding in Olech portends
the following seemingly anomalous scenario: an individual white male,
who claims only that a government official has pressed upon him a burden
not equally shared by others, irvoking a constitutional provision originally
intended to lift blacks from the second-class caste they occupied after the
Civil War. According to the Supreme Court, it is a settled principle that the
Equal Protection Clause empowersan individual to fight city hall in federal
court. 30 The Court reachedthis result, however, without even examining the
text of the Equal Protection Clause, the history leading to its adoption, a
century of jurisprudence that has in the main interpreted the clause to
prohibit only disparate treatment based upon group or class factors, and
conflicting language in its own precedents. Indeed, the Court, often
criticized for its lengthy and fractured opinions, devoted little more than
two pages to this inportant issue. The little-noticed per curiam opinion
should serve to create significant confusion in the lower courts.
This Article contends that the holding in Olech was not dictated by the
Supreme Court's prior precedents. Indeed, Olech is contrary to the manner
in which the Court has historically interpreted the equal protection
guarantee. The opinion, cryptic though it may be, will have a significant
impact upon equal protection claims. For example, under Olech individual
criminal prosecutions, employment decisions, and innumerable zoning and
other local ordinances could give rise to an equal protection claim.
Part Il reviews the circuit opinions that addressed the single-member
class theory prior to Olech, with emphasis on the Seventh Circuit's recent
Equal Protection Clause where the decision to prosecute is made either m
retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right, such as freedom of speech or
religion, or because of membership in a vulnerable group. Id. at 608. See also
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (holding that selective enforcement
clais may be based upon arbitrary classifications).
1 See Olech, 120 S. Ct. at 1075. Only Justice Breyer found the presence of
allegations of bad faith significant He stated m a concurring opinion that the
"added factor" of ill will was "sufficient to minimize any concern about
transforming run-of-the-mill zoning cases into cases of constitutional right." Id.
(Breyer, J., concurring).
291Id. at 1074-75.
'0 See id.
2000-2001]
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case law, as that court has offered the most explicit justification for
bringing the vindictive action cases within the Equal Protection Clause.
3'
Part III analyzes, in broad terms, the "original understanding" of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Not surprisingly, the framers and ratifiers did not
consider, much less settle, whether an individual could resort to the Equal
Protection Clause in cases where government officials allegedly treated
hun arbitrarily. What the framers did establish, however, and what the
Court had for a century prior to Olech seemed to accept, is that the
principal goal of the equal protection guarantee was to prohibit legislation
that, like the Black Codes, had the effect of creating a subordinate or
subjugated caste of citizens unequal under the law. Thus, from the
beginning, the Equal Protection Clause was concerned with the legitimacy
of differential treatment afforded to similarly situated groups of persons.32
Part IV examines the Supreme Court's equal protection framework and
the principal theoretical paradigms that the Court's equal protection cases
have spawned in the academic literature. Notwithstanding occasional
statements concerning the "personal" nature ofthe rights guaranteed by the
Equal Protection Clause, scholars have noted that the framers' focus on
illegitimate classifications and subjugation of members of certain groups
is the dominant mediating principle underlying the Supreme Court's equal
protection jurisprudence
3
Part V concludes that the original understanding ofthe equal protection
guarantee, the Supreme Court's subsequent delineation of the meaning of
equality, and the theoretical underpinnings of the equal protection
guarantee do not support extending the Equal Protection Clause to single-
member classes who allege differential treatment based upon individual
factors. While ultimately involving "personal" rights, in the sense that an
individual always is harmed or benefitted by governmental action, "equal
protection" is bound up intrinsicaly with the notion of group classifica-
tion-a notion that does not permit the individual victim of every alleged
instance of mistreatment to invoke its guarantee. The Court's extension of
equal protection in Olech removes any vestige of a mediating principle
from the Equal Protection Clause, imperils the principles of separation of
powers and federalism, and trivializes the Fourteenth Amendment by
constitutionalizing and federalizing every local dispute between a citizen
and a government official.
34
3,See infra notes 36-121 and accompanying text.
32See infra notes 122-51 and accompanying text.
33See infra notes 152-216 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 217-310 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Part VI argues that the allegations in Olech and similar cases
are more properly the subject of the Due Process Clause, in particular its
substantive component, which has traditionally been viewed by the
Supreme Court as the constitutional provision that protects individuals
from arbitrary governmental action. Concerned that the Federal Constitu-
tion could be read to supplant state law, however, the Supreme Court has
made clear in its substantive due process cases that, with regard to
executive acts, only conduct that can be said to "shock the conscience" is
subject to constitutional rebuke. Moreover, tins Article argues that "class
of one" clamis threaten to superimpose the federal constitution on state
administrative law. Thus, if these claims are to be allowed under Olech,
they should be subject to the same exacting conscience-shocking standard
as are substantive due process claims. Under that standard, only conduct
that is arbitrary in the constitutional sense would be actionable under the
Equal Protection Clause."
H. "VINDICTIVE ACTIoN" AND EQUAL PROTECTION
In its recent trilogy of "vindictive action" cases, the Seventh Circuit
held that the Equal Protection Clause protects a person who alleges that
a state actor withheld a benefit or enforced a law or regulation out of
spite or illegitimate animus.36 The First and Second Circuits have also
embraced the notion that an individual has a right under the Equal
Protection Clause to be free from "malicious" or "bad faith" govern-
mental action. The Sixth Circuit, fearing that such a ruling would cause
disputes between local administrators and citizens to overwhelm the federal
courts, has held that a "class of one" cannot invoke the Equal Protection
Clause absent one of the circumstances identified by the Supreme Court as
a basis for a Fourteenth Amendment "selective prosecution" claim-i.e.,
35See infra notes 311-51 and accompanying text.
36See infra Part H.A. While the "vindictive action" theory has been embraced
by different panels of the Seventh Circuit, it is by no means clear that the theory is
accepted by the entire circuit. Esmail and its progeny appear to be n conflict with
other Seventh Circuit precedent. See Herro v. City of Milwaukee, 44 F.3d 550, 552
(7th Cir. 1995) ("A person bringing an action under the Equal Protection Clause
must show intentional discrimination against hun because of Is membership in a
particular class, not merely that he was treated unfairly as an individual." (quoting
NewBurnham Prairie Homes v. Village ofBumham, 910 F.2d 1474,1481 (7th Cir.
1990)).
37See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
2000-20011
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a claim ofmembership in a protected group or violation of a constitutional
right.
38
A. The Seventh Circuit Trilogy-The Individual Right to Equality
The Seventh Circuit's trilogy of "vindictive action" equal protection
cases began with Esmail v. Macrane.39 In Esmail, a liquor dealer alleged
that the mayor of Naperville, Illinois saw to it that his application to
renew a retail liquor license was denied. The dealer obtained a state court
order granting the license renewal, then sued the mayor in federal
court under the Equal Protection Clause, alleging that the mayor had forced
him to spend $75,000 in legal fees out of "deep-seated anmnosity" toward
him. 4 The mayor's alleged "campaign of vengeance" was attributed
primarily to the dealer's past success in getting a liquor license revoca-
tion changed to a brief suspension and the dealer's withdrawal of political
support from the mayor." In Ins complaint, the dealer alleged that the
city routinely renewed the liquor licenses of others guilty of similar, if not
more serious, infractions of the law, and denied Ins application "for the
sole and exclusive purpose of exacting retaliation and vengeance" against
hr.42
The district court dismissed the equal protection cause of action for
failure to state a claim.43 The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion authored by
Chief Judge Posner, reversed." The court acknowledged that the case did
not fit into the two common lands of equal protection cases: those
involving "charges of singling out members of a vulnerable group, racial
or otherwise, for unequal treatment," and those involving "challenges to
laws or policies alleged to make irrational distinctions."4 5 Nor did the case,
the court noted, fit the usual mode of selective prosecution cases "where
the decision to prosecute is made either in retaliation for the exercise of a
constitutional right, or because of membership in a vulnerable group.'46
Rather, the distinctive feature of the plaintiff's claim was that the unequal
38See infra notes 94-117 and accompanying text.
39Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).
40Id. at- 178.
41 Id.
42Id.
431 Id. at 177
4Id. at 180.
451 Id. at 178.
4Id. at 179.
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treatment was alleged to have been the result solely of a vindictive
campaign by the mayor.47
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits government actions taken for illegitimate or wholly irrational
objectives, regardless of whether the victim of those actions is a member
of a protected group. The court found ample room under the equal
protection umbrella for "vindictive action" claims brought by individual
plaintiffs." The court stated that "[i]fthe power of government is brought
to bear on a harmless individual merely because a powerful state or local
official harbors a malignant animosity toward him, the individual ought to
have a remedy in federal court. ' 9 This principle, the court stated, was
"implied '"' by the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.," in which the Court held that requiring a special use permit
for a proposed group home for the mentally retarded violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it appeared to rest solely upon an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded. 2 The Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that the abuse charged by Esmail was "remote from the primary
concern of the fiamers of the equal protection clause." Nevertheless, the
court observed that the clause "neither in terms norm interpretation is
limited to protecting members of identifiable groups."' Indeed, the court
concluded, "[a] class of one is likely to be the most vulnerable of all, and
we do not understand therefore why it should be demed the protection of
the equal protection clause." 5
471d. at 179-80.
481d. at 180.
49 Id. at 179.
50Id.
11 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Livmg Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
S2Id. at 450.
13Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180.
5 Id.
I Id. The court acknowledged that pror Seventh Circuit precedents appeared
to hold that a class must have more than one member for discrimination against the
class to count as a denial of equal protection. Id. But the court noted that other
circuit opinions had "pomt[ed] out sensibly that classifications should be
scrutinized more carefully the smaller and more vulnerable the class is."Id. Indeed,
Esmail was not the Seventh Circuit's first foray into the class of one debate. In
Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982), the Seventh Circuit
allowed a class of one equal protection claim to go forward. Ciechon involved two
paramedics identically responsible for the death of a patient, yet only one was
disciplined and the city could not provide a reason for the difference in treatment.
2000-2001]
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In the second case mn the Seventh Circuit trilogy, Indiana State
TeachersAss 'n v. Indianapolis Board ofSchool Commissioners,5 the court
rebuffed a union's effort to invoke Esmail. The union complained that the
Indianapolis school board, m the absence of any statutory collective
bargaining scheme, had signed a succession ofcontracts with anotherunion
to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the school system's non-
teacher employees and would not permit an election for a collective
bargaining representative. The plaintiffunion assertedthat the school board
was thus discriminating between two similarly situated entities in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The school
board argued that the union could not invoke the Equal Protection Clause
because it did not allege discrimination against a class." The Seventh
Circuit, again speaking through Cuef Judge Posner, reaffirmed that
"[w]hile the principal target of the equal protection clause is discrimination
against members of vulnerable groups," a protected class for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause may consist of a single member." ChefJudge
Posner wrote:
The equal protection clause does not speak of classes. A class, moreover,
can consist ofa single member.. or ofone member at present; and it can
be defined by reference to the discrmimation itself. To make "classifica-
tion" an element of a denial of equal protection would therefore be
vacuous. There is always a class.
5 9
The court went on to state that Esmail applies only when the govern-
ment is treating unequally "persons who are prima facie identical in all
relevant respects."6 In the case oftheunions, however, the court concluded
that the government was "treating unequally two persons that [were] prima
facie unequal in a rationally relevant respect."'6 On the one hand, there was
the union with which the government had been dealing contentedly for
many years. On the other, there was the plaintiffunion, which wished not
only to break up the cozy existing relationship, but also to change the
Id. at 522-24.
6 Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v. Indianapolis Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d
1179 (7th Cir. 1996).
171d. at 1180.
SlId. at 1181.
59 Id. (citations omitted).
60Id.
6 Id. at 1182.
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means by which a favored union would be chosen m the future.62 Under
these circumstances, the court held that "the equal protection clause is
inapplicable because the plaintiff is asking for a revision of policy rather
than for a restoration of equality."63 In sum, the court concluded that
"[tihere is nothing irrational or vicious about preferringthe known quantity
to the unknown.
'"
Notwithstanding its assurance that single member classes could revoke
the Equal Protection Clause, the Seventh Circuit warned that not every
slight suffered at the hands of local government officials was subject to
review in federal court:
The concept of equal protection is trivialized when it is used to subject
every decision made by state or local government to constitutional review
by federal courts. To decide is to choose, and ordinarily to choose
between-to choose one suppliant, applicant, petitioner, protester,
contractor, or employee over another. Can the loser m the contest
automatically appeal to the federal courts on the ground that the decision
was arbitrary and an arbitrary decision treats likes as unlike and therefore
demes the equal protection of the laws? That would constitutionalize the
Administrative Procedure Act and make its provisions binding on state
and local government and enforceable in the federal courts.65
The court was concerned that the plaintiff union was requesting that it
adjudicate a difference of opinion as to the appropriate policy the school
board should follow with regard to its process of labor relations and
competitive bidding.6 According to the court, review of the school board's
decision for violation of equal protection was beyond the purview of
federal courts, "which would be operating without any guidance other than
what might be thought implicit in the idea of arbitrary governmental
action." 7
In the third case, Olech v. Village of Willowbrook,6" which ultimately
made its way to the Supreme Court, a homeowner alleged that the village
62Id. at 1181-82.
6Id. at 1182.
6Id.
65 d. at 1181.
6See id. at 1181-82:
671d. at 1181.
68 Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), affdper
curnam, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000).
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of Willowbrook delayed provision of water services for three months
because she would not agree to a thirty-three foot easement to permit the
village to widen the street, m lieu of the usual fifteen foot easement
required for hookup to the water mai. The homeowner alleged that the
city's demand for a wider easement and the associated delay were in
retaliation for her earlier, successful property damage suit against the city 
69
The district court dismissed the homeowner's equal protection claim
because she did not allege an "'orchestrated campaign of official
harassment' motivated by'sheer malice. "I7 But the Seventh Circuit, Chief
Judge Posner again writing for the panel, said that:
[N]othmg mtheEsmailopinion, however, suggests ageneralrequirement
of "orchestration" m vindictive-action equal protection cases, let alone a
legally significant distinction between "sheer malice" and "substantial ill
will," if, as alleged here, the ill will is the sole cause of the action of
which the plaintiff complains.7
It was enough, the court said, that the city failed for three months to
perform its obligation to provide a water hookup "for no reason other than
a baseless hatred."
Again, however, the Seventh Circuit voiced some reservations with
regard to the possible consequences of its portentous holdings in Esmail
and Indiana State Teachers' Ass'n. Chief Judge Posner wrote:
Of course we are troubled, as was the district judge, by the prospect of
turning every squabble over municipal services, of which there must be
tens or even hundreds of thousands every year, into a federal constitu-
tional case. But bear in mmd that the 'vindictive action' class of equal
protection cases requires proof that the cause of the differential treatment
of which the plaintiff complains was a totally illegitimate annmus toward
the plaintiff by the defendant. If the defendant would have taken the
complained-of action anyway, even if it didn't have the antmus, the
animus would not condemn the action; a tincture of ill will does not
invalidate governmental action.
73
69 Id. at 387-88.
7 Id. at 388 (quoting Esmail v Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995)).
71 Id.
72Id.
7 Id.
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The First and Second Circuits have also embraced single-member class
"vindictive action" claims under the Equal Protection Clause. The First
Circuit allows a plaintiff to establish an equal protection violation with
evidence of "bad faith or malicious intent to injure."74 While noting that
vindictive action cases will be "infrequent ' and that the malice standard
should be "scrupulously met,' 76 the First Circuit permits such equal
protection claims to survive summary judgment, at least where there is
evidence of a "malicious orchestrated campaign causing substantial
harm." Similarly, the Second Circuit has permitted "selective enforce-
ment" of equal protection claims where a plaintiff can demonstrate that a
government official maliciously singled htm or her out with bad faith intent
to injure7
B. The Opposing View-One is Not Enough
In 1995, the same year Esmail breathed life into "classes of one"
alleging "vindictive action" under the Equal Protection Clause, a different
panel ofthe Seventh Circuit strongly suggested that an individual claiming
to be the victim of a personal vendetta does not state a claim under the
clause. In Herro v. City of Milwaukee,7 9 a disappointed applicant for a
tavern license filed an action claiming that Ins equal protection rights had
been violated. The plaintiff alleged that a city alderman acted to block Ins
application out of sheer animosity or prejudice. 80 The Herro court
acknowledged that some "older cases" from the circuit suggested that a
74 Rubmovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 911 (1st Cir. 1995).
7S Id.
76 Id.
7Id. at 912.
7' Crowley v. Courville, 76 F.3d 47, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1996). Classes of one may
be entitled to bring their equal protection claims m the First and Second Circuits,
but to state that a "vindictive action" claim nught ultimately prevail in either the
First or Second Circuit is another matter entirely. See, e.g., Rubinovitz, 60 F.3d at
911 (affirming grant of summary judgment because evidence of malice was
insufficient); FSK Drug Corp. v. Perales, 960 F.2d 6, 10 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming
irant of summary judgment because evidence of malice was insufficient);
Yerardi's Moody St. Restaurant& Lounge, Inc. v. Bd. of Selectmen, 878 F.2d 16,
20-21 (lst Cir. 1989) (holding that individual defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity); LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversing
judgment for plaintiff at trial because evidence of malice was insufficient).
79 Herro v. City of Milwaukee, 44 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 1995).
8Od. at 551.
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"class of only one" could state an equal protection claim,"1 but stated that
its "more recent cases place additional burdens on plaintiffs to identify
the classification behind, a 'class of one."' 82 The court suggested that
plaintiff's claim would have been stronger had he alleged "a classification
consisting of all members of the Herro family applying for new tavern
licenses."83 In any event, the court held that defendants had offered rational
reasons for the denial of the tavern license, winch was all that the Equal
Protection Clause required.
s4
The "more recent" cases referred to by the Herro court explicitly held
that a "class of one" could not bring an equal protection claim. In Smith
v. Town of Eaton,5 for example, the Seventh Circuit stated that a
white police officer's claim that his dismissal violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause "border[ed] on the frivolous." 6 Plaintiff claimed that while
the town board had information regarding similar complaints lodged
against two other officers, it did not suspend or dismiss them." Quoting
one of its earlier precedents, the court noted that "[a]n equal protection
clai must be based on 'intentional discrimination against [the plain-
tiff] because of his membership in a particular class, not merely [because]
he was treated unfairly as an individual.' ,88 As the plaintiff did not allege
such class-based discrimination, the court held that his claim could not
stand.89
In New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham,90 land-
owners and a developer asserted that the Village of Burnham's demal of a
building permit violatedthe Equal Protection Clause." The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the plaintiffs' Equal Protection Clause clann lacked merit
81 Id. at 553. The court cited Falls v. Town of Dyer, 875 F.2d 146 (7th Cir.
1989), winch held that a class of only one member can state a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause if the plamtiff can show that a combination of legislative
and executive action has singled him out for umque treatment Id.
12 Herro, 44 F.3d at 553.
83 Id.
4Id.
8' Smith v. Town of Eaton, 910 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1990).
61 Id. at 1472.
87 Id.
"Id. (citations omitted).
"Id. at 1473.
90 New Burnham Prame Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474
(7th Cir. 1990).911 d. at 1475-76.
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because the "plaintiffs [did] not allege that they [were] singled out because
they belong to any particular class."91 The court set forth the governing
standard for equal protection claims: "In order to assert a constitutional
claim based on violation of equal protection, a complaining party must
assert disparate treatment based on their membership m a particular group.
Discrimination based merely on individual, rather than group, reasons will
not suffice."93
In accord with this group of Seventh Circuit opinions is Futernick v.
Sumpter Township," m which the Sixth Circuit rejected what amounted to
a "malicious enforcement" claim. 95 The plaintiff, who owned a trailer park,
sued a Michigan official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of his right
to equal protection, alleging that the official had selectively enforced state
environmental regulations, delayed a sewer hookup "maliciously" and in
"bad faith," and conspired with the townslp to charge an exorbitant sewer
hookup fee.
96
The district court dismssedthe plaintiff's equal protection claim.9 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed.98 The court reviewed the law concerning the
doctrine of selective enforcement, under which a plamtiff may have a
viable equal protection claim if the decision to enforce the law is made
either in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right or because of
membership in a vulnerable group.99 Futermck.the court noted, did not
claim to be a member of any group; nor did he clai that he was being
punished for exercising a constitutional right. The Sixth Circuit did not cite
Esmail, but it expressly declined to accept plaintiff s "class of one" equal
protection theory 11 The Sixth Circuit relied principally on Oyler v.
Boles,1°0 in which-according to the Sixth Circuit-the Supreme Court
"mention[ed] only arbitrary classifications as a basis for selective
enforcement liability."' 2 The Sixth Circuit went on to say that it "[did] not
92 Id. at 1481-82.
931 Id. at 1481.
9 Futenmckv. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996).
9See d. at 1060.
9 Id. at 1052-54.
97 Id. at 1052.
98 Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to all claims except the District Court's
finding of Eleventh Amendment immunity for some defendants. Id.
" Id. at 1056 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
100 Id. at 1057-60.
101 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
102 Futerick, 78 F.3d at 1058 (citations omitted).
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believe that choosing to enforce the law against a particular individual is
a 'classification' as that term is normally understood."10 s
The Sixth Circuit's difficultywith the plaintiff s claim went beyondthe
nature of the odd-looking "class" plaintiff purported to represent. There
were federalism and separation of powers concerns as well.' °4 The
Futernck court set forth several "compelling reasons that the sundry
motivations of local regulators should not be policed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, absent the intent to
harm a protected group or pumsh the exercise of a fundamental right.""05
First, the court was discouraged by the "sheer number of possible cases"
and the effect on the efficiency of state and local administrators. 106 As the
court explained:
Legislatures often combine tough laws with limited funding for enforce-
ment A regulator is required to make difficult, and often completely
arbitrary, decisions about who will bear the brunt of finite efforts to
enforce the law. As a result, even a moderately artful complaint could
paint almost any regulatory action as both selective and mean-spited.107
The court acknowledged that some circuits, most notably the First and
Second, had purported to solve this dilemma by limiting the availability of
actions grounded upon a regulator's malice to those in which a plaintiff is
able to prove that others who are similarly situated "in all relevant aspects"
have not been regulated.108 Although the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
this approach allows only cases of "extraordinary selectivity to state a
claim," it nevertheless rejected the approach as a screening device because
"[d]etermmmg 'all relevant aspects' of similar situations usually depends
on too many facts (and too much discovery) to allow dismissal on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion." 109 The court concluded that "[i]f we require defendants
to wait until summary judgment, we burden local and state officials with
" Id. The court relied on Webster's dictionary to support its determination that
classes of one are, in fact, not "classes" at all for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 417 (1986)
(defining "classify" as "to group or segregate in classes that have systematic
relations usually founded on common properties or characters; sorf').
114 See Futernick, 78 F.3d at 1058.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id
" ld. (quoting Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906,910 (1st Cir. 1995)).
109 Id
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the regular prospect of 'fishing expeditions' and meritless suits. In the
meantime we federalize and constitutionalize what are essentially issues of
local law and policy.""'
Second, from a theoretical standpoint, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
"[t]he nature of the right to equal protection also counsels against
expanding a federal right to protection from non-group animosity on the
part of local officials.""' The court pointed out that perfectly random
enforcement of a law would not implicate the Equal Protection Clause."
2
Similarly, the court stated, "the presence of personal animosity should not
turn an otherwise valid enforcement action into a violation of the
Constitution.""' The court explained:
From a constitutional perspective, personal ammosity not related to group
identity or the exercise of protected rights is as random as the roll of a
dice. There is no constitutionally significant category ofpeople that have
a greater or lesser chance of being affected by it. The Constitution's
protection begins only when the incidence of the burden of regulation
becomes constitutionally suspicious.14
It was, then, the wholly arbitrary or "random" nature ofpersonal ammosity
that, in the Sixth Circuit's view, rendered the Equal Protection Clause
inapposite."
s
Although the Sixth Circuit hastened to add that it did not condone the
abuse of local or state regulatory power, describing such abuse as
"repugnant to the American tradition of the rule of law," the court went on
to state that local governments were in the best position to correct for any
abuse through the "political processes that appointed [the] regulator m the
first place."' 6 Further, a plaintiff could seek redress in state courts and
under state constitutions. "Absent a breakdown in the state's normal
political process that unfairly affects a protected group or the exercise of
constitutional rights, we can and should trust states to police adequately
their own processes."
'"17
10 Id. at 1058-59 (footnote omitted).
"I Id. at 1059.
1 2 See Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
116Id.
117Id.
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In Olech,"8 however, the Supreme Courtwent even further than hadthe
Seventh, First, and Second Circuits in their "class of one" precedents,
consequently disregarding the Sixth Circuit's concerns for allowing
"fishing expeditions."'1 9 The Court did not reach the principles of
"illegitimate ammus" or "intent to injure" relied upon by those courts to
limit the scope of the "class of one" theory Rather, the Court held that
individual mistreatment by local government officials could be challenged
under the federal constitution regardless of the motivation behind the
conduct.2 0 Henceforth, a plaintiff who wishes to proceed in federal court
under the Equal Protection Clause need only allege that a government
official has acted arbitrarily or irrationally, and has treated the plaintiff less
favorably than those similarly situated.'2 ' The Supreme Court's apparent
resolution of the circuits' divergence in views as to the purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause (i.e., whether the clause was intended to protect
not only groups but also "classes of one") merits examination of the
original purpose of the clause.
I. THE ORIGiNAL UNDERSTANDING: STRIKING AT CASTES
As noted, the intended scope of the protections afforded by the Equal
Protection Clause is a matter of ongoing scholarly debate. The debates of
the Thirty-Ninth Congress, which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, are
far too ambiguous to settle many important questions such as whether the
framers of the Equal Protection Clause, intended to procure for blacks
political or social equality on abroad scale or, more narrowly, to secure for
them only those rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.'2 They
certainly do not tell us whether the architects of the clause intended to
extend "equal protection" to a so-called "class of one." No one in the
Thirty-Ninth Congress considered whether an individual could challenge
government action motivated by alleged illegitimate animus under the
Equal Protection Clause. The concerns of the time, which included the
plight of the newly-freed slaves in the aftermath of a Civil War fought, in
part, to render them free, were far weightier.
Although answers to specific questions are rarely found in the original
debates, considered in broader terms the intent of the framers is readily
"' Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per cunam).
119 See supra notes 94-117 and accompanying text
20 Olech, 120 S. Ct. at 1074-75.
121 See 1d. at 1075.
2 See supra note 7 and accompanymg text
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discernible. As Professor Sunstem has noted, "[tihe Civil War Amend-
ments were based on a wholesale rejection of the supposed naturalness of
racial ierarchy. An unportant purpose of the-Civil War Amendments
was the attack on racial caste."'1 The Thirteenth Amendment, ratified in
1865, formally abolished slavery and represented Congress' first constitu-
tional and legislative attack on the caste system." Although the Thirteenth
Amendment formally abolished slavery, Congress was confronted afterthe
amendments ratificationby activities in several intransigent southern states
that sought to re-establish many of the badges of inferiority incident to
slavery. In the wmter of 1865-66, southern states enacted what were known
as the "Black Codes," many ofwhich prohibited blacks from owning land,
voting, engaging in any activity other than domestic service, or leaving
theirjobs without suffering the forfeiture of earned pay.'2 To many in the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, the Black Codes were symbolic of an unrepentant
South seeking to return to a caste system under which blacks continued to
occupy the inferior status imposed by the institution of slavery 2 6
Prior to seeking a constitutional amendment to remedy the situation,
Congress triedits hand at alegislative solution. On April 9,1866, Congress
overrode President Andrew Johnson's veto ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which expressly provided the right to "citizens, of every race and color" to
make and enforce contracts, be parties in court, to own and convey real and
'23 Sunstem, supra note 8, at 2435 (footnote omitted). Professor Sunstem traces
the origms of the anticaste principle to the original framing of the Constitution. He
points out that "the Constitution forbids titles of nobility and that an important part
ofthe founding creed involved the rejection ofmonarchical heritage, largely on the
ground that monarchy made caste distinctions among fundamentally equal human
beings." Id. at 2434-35. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)
(stating that the legislature should not enact "unjust and partial laws" that operate
"to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens").
124 The Thirteenth Amendment provides, in part: "[n]either slavery nor invol-
untary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
ther jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. For a discussion of the events
leading to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, see G. Sidney Buchanan, The
Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L.
Rsv 1 (1974).
" See Aremona G. Bennett, Phantom Freedom: OfficialAcceptance of Vio-
lence to Personal Security and Subversion of Proprietary Rights and Ambitions
FollowingEmancqpation, 1865-1910,70 Ci-r.-KENT L. REv 439,453-61 (1994).
126 See David F Forte, Spiritual Equality, The Black Codes and the Amer-
canization of the Freedmen, 43 LoY. L. REv 569, 604-09 (1998).
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personal property, to enjoy the full benefit of all laws for the security of
person or property enjoyed by white persons, and to be subject to like
pumshment andnone other.127 Many Republicans in Congress believedthat
the Civil Rights Act was beyond the constitutional power of Congress.'1
2
There was also widespread concern that the rights enumerated in the Civil
Rights Act ought not be left to the discretion of future Congresses.' 29
The Fourteenth Amendment, which had been under consideration for
two months pnorto Johnson's veto, was designed principally to protect the
Civil Rights Act from constitutional attack. 30 Representative John
Bingham of Ohio first set forth the "equal protection" language that would
ultimately appear in section I of the Fourteenth Amendment m a proposed
amendment that would have granted to Congress the power "to pass all
necessary and proper laws to secure to all persons in every State of the
Umon equal protection m their rights, life, liberty, and property'"
3'
Bingham himself was not particularly clear with regard to the intended
purpose of the proposed amendment, but participants in the debate
understood Bingham's language to prohibit only laws that singled out
certain classes of persons for special benefits or burdens. 32 Like many
others, Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine, the conservative leader
of the Republican majority in the Senate, understood the language to be
amned at the impermissible "class legislation" of the Black Codes.'33
127 Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1991)).
"' See Bickel, supra note 7, at 22.
129 See BERGER, supra note 7, at 23.
130 See id., see also Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV L. REV 1, 14 (1977).
,3' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865). As it would finally appear
after several revisions, the proposed amendment read:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states and to all persons in the
several States, equal protection m the rights of life, liberty, and property.
BENJ. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION 61 (1914) (citations omitted).
"2 See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Color-
blindness, 96 MICH L. REv 245, 282-83 (1997).
'3 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1866). Similar sentiments had
been expressed during the debate over the Civil Rights Act. Representative James
Wilson, the Iowa Republican who sponsored the bill in the House, said it would
mean only that "[o]ne class shall not be required to support alone the burdens
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Representative Hotchkiss of New York, a moderate Republican who spoke
against Bingham's proposal, stated that its equal protection language was
designed to forbid a state to "discriminate between its citizens and give one
class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another."134 While he
found this a laudable goal, Hotchkiss refused to support the proposal
because it left protection against unequal legislation to Congress's whim.35
Better, he thought, to enact language that outlawed all such legislation by
providing that "no State shall discriminate against any class of its
citizens. ' 3
Hotchkiss's suggestion was not ignored. In fact, when the equal
protection proposal reemerged from Committee, it had been changed from
a grant of authority to Congress to its present form-a limitation, though
an unspecified one, principally on state legislative authority. 137 The
proponents of the revised equal protection language explained that it dealt
a blow to existing special class legislation m the states. Senator Jacob
Howard, a Michigan Republican, delivered the speech presenting the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate. 138 The speech deserves special
attention, as it represented the Joint Committee's official explanation of its
proposal. 39 Senator Howard explained:
[The Equal Protection Clause] abolishes all class legislation m the States
and does away with the mjustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a
code not applicable to another. It prohibits the hanging ofa black man for
a crime for wluch the white man is not to be hanged. It protects the black
man m his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same shield which it
throws over the white man. Is it not time, Mr. President, that we extend
to the black man, I had almost called it the poor privilege of the equal
protection of the law 9 Ought not the time to be now passed when one
which should rest on all classes alike."Id. at 1117. PresidentAndrew Johnson, who
vetoed the Civil Rights Act, nevertheless objected to the Black Codes on similar
grounds. In his December 1865 State of the Umon address, President Johnson
declared that "there is no room for favored classes or monopolies." 6 JAMES D.
RICHARDSON,ACOMPILATIONOFTHE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS:
1789-1897, 361-62 (1901).
'1 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
135 See id.
136 Id.
131 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
13 8 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-67 (1866).
1
39 See JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OFTHE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 137
(1956).
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measure of justice is to be meted out to a member of one caste while
another and a different measure is meted out to the member of another
caste, both castes being alike citizens of the United States, both bound to
obey the same laws, to sustain the burdens of-the same Government, and
both equally responsible to justice and to God for the deeds done m the
body?"4'
Other members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress expressed similar
sentiments in support of the equal protection proposal. Representative
James Wilson of Iowa, for example, stated that in a true republican
government there is "no class legislation, no class pnvileges," and no laws
that legislate "against [one class] for the purpose of advantaging the
interests of [another]."141 To the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Black Codes epitomized such legislation; the Codes reduced the newly
freed slaves to a condition of involuntary servitude that undermined the
command of the Thirteenth Amendment. 42
Throughout the ratification process, Republicans consistently lauded
the protection afforded by equal protection against inpermissible class
legislation. 143 Senator Timothy Howe of Wisconsin said that the Equal
Protection Clause was designedto prevent the states from "deny[ing] to all
classes of its citizens the protection of equal laws"'" andto give the federal
government "the power to protect classes against class legislation."'45
Representative Thomas Eliot of Massachusetts stated that the clause would
"prohibit State legislation discriminating against classes of citizens."'' 1
Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvama said that it would mean
140 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
141 Id. at 174.
142 See id. at 1621-22, where Representative Myers suggested that the Black
Codes "impose by indirection a servitude which the Constitution now forbids." Id.
Representative Thayer argued that the Black Codes were being used to "reduce
this class of pepple to the condition of bondmen." Id. at 1151. Senator Wilson
stated that Black Codes "practically make the freedman a peon or a serf." Id. at
340.
14" See NELSON, supra note 7, at 115. Nelson observes that Republicans fre-
quently stated that the "only effect" of the Equal Protection Clause would be to
forbid the states from "discrimmat[ing] arbitrarily between different classes of
citizens" and to require them to "treat[ ] [their] citizens equally, distinguishing
between them only when there was a basis m reason for doing so." Id.
144 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 219 (1866).
145 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 883 (1868).
146 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866).
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only that "the same laws must and shall apply to every mortal, American,
Irishman, African, German or Turk."147
Thus the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment were
concerned with class legislation that imposed special burdens on one class
of citizens that were not to be shared by others, or granted special benefits
to one class not granted to another, primarily because such special
legislation "embodied discrimination and in this way helped to create
caste."' 48 As one commentator has observed: "The idea that laws should be
general and not tainted by considerations of class or caste was widely
recognized and accepted before the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment was
enacted."'149 As Justice Harlan, dissenting m Plessy v. Ferguson,150
eloquently and succinctly stated the principle: "[I]n view of the Constitu-
tion, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant,
ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here."' 5'
IV EQUAL PROTECTION THEORY
The Supreme Court's theory of wrongful discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clausehas come a longway since JusticeHarlan's dissent
in Plessy. The anti-caste principle articulated by Justice Harlan was
embraced by Congress, and eventually by the Court, as it stepped in to
147 Thaddeus Stevens, The Pending Canvass!, Speech Delivered at Bedford, Pa.
(Sept. 4, 1866), in THADDEUS STEVENS PAPERS 11 (Beverly Wilson Palmer ed.,
1993).
148 Sunstem, supra note 8, at 2436. One commentator has argued that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood the Equal Protection Clause to
nationalize a prohibition against "partial" or "special" laws, which singled out
groups of persons for special benefits or burdens and had been developed m the
state.courts m the first half of the nineteenth century. See Melissa L. Saunders,
Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH L. REV 245
(1997). Professor Saunders argues that while the framers of the Equal Protection
Clause did intend to abolish all "caste" legislation, as Professor Sunstem and others
have argued, they used the term "class" legislation m a broader sense-"to refer to
any law that singled out a certain class for special benefits or burdens, whether or
not it had a subordinating effect on a particular class." Id. at 290 n.198.
149 Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discri-
mnation: One Small Cheerfor Mr Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 88 MICH. L.
REV 1366, 1376 (1990).
"0 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
.. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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adjudicate and implement the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 2 The Supreme
Court, however, found itselfill-equippedto enforce the anti-casteprinciple,
a task better left to Congress through the legislative function. To be sure,
the Court continues to be sensitive to the stigmatization ofprotected groups
by legislative act. That concern, against sigmatization, was at the heart of
the Fourteenth Amendment from the beginning, and some equal protection
theories focus exclusively on the plight of historically subjugated groups
or classes. Modem equal protection jurisprudence, however, has become
more generally concernedwith whether like classes are treated alike bythe
government.
"Classes of one" who claim that local administrators have engaged in
arbitrary or irrational decisionmaking do not raise core issues of caste or
stigmatization. That is not to say, however, that nothing can be learned
from theories based on caste or stigma, or, for that matter, from the
framers' original intentions. This portion of the Article briefly explores
some of the principal theories of equal protection. Although the focus of
equal protection theories has varied, the unifying principle-borrowed
from the framers themselves-has remamedthat governmental actions that
intentionally disadvantage certain groups, or certain individuals as
members of a group, are forbidden under the Equal Protection Clause.
A. Theories of Stigma and Caste
There are four principal theories of equal protection, three of which
will be discussed in Parts IVA and IV.B. Only one of the four theo-
nes-the so-called "anti-differentiation principle"--bears directly on the
"class of one" scenario. This theory is discussedm somewhat greater detail
in Part IV.C.
1. The Anti-Discrimination Prnciple--Stigma
The "stigma" theory"5 of equal protection can be tracedto the Supreme
Court's opinion in Brown v. Board ofEducation and, before that decision,
to Justice Harlan's dissent mPlessy. It was perhaps best articulated by Paul
1 Perhaps the Court's best known anti-caste decisions are Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which invalidated segregation m education, and
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which struck down state miscegenation
laws.
1s3 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting the detrimental impact of segregation).
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Brest,' who used the phrase "anti-discrimination principle" to describe
"the general principle disfavoring classifications and other decisions and
practices that depend on the race (or ethnic origin) of the parties
affected." 155 The theory focuses on the unfair stigma caused by race-based
decisions that disadvantage members of minority groups. Brest focuses on
the harm caused by race-based classifications: "Decisions based on
assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indifference inflict psychologi-
cal injury by stigmatizing their victims as inferior."1 5 Ths theory helps to
explain why rules that employ "suspect" predicates, such as racial
predicates, are uniquely subject to judicial invalidation under the Equal
Protection Clause.
As Justice Black explained in Korematsu v. United States,15 the case
in which the government attempted to justify the internment of Japanese-
Americans: "[A]U legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. .[C]ourts must subject them to the
most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the
existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can."158 Although
concerned primarily with racial stigmatization, the anti-discrimiation
principle is broad enough to protect other group traits as well, including sex
and illegitimacy 159
While concerned with the harmful effects ofdiscnmmation basedupon
membership in racial or ethnic groups, the anti-discrimiation principle is
an individualistic theory, concerned with the harm visited upon individual
members of the singled-out group.160 The group itself, under this theory,
has no mtrinsic moral value or right to compensation for harm visited upon
its members. As Brest explained in his seminal article:
For administrative purposes, some remedies for racial discrimination are
triggered by disproportionate racial impact or treat persons according to
memberslp m racial groups; but group membership is always a proxy for
the individual's right not to be discriminated against. Similarly, remedies
for race-specific harms recognize the sociological consequences of group
154 Paul Brest, In Defense oftheAntidiscnzmznation Pnnciple, 90 HARV.L.REV
1 (1976).
155 Id. at 1.
156 Id. at8.
"I Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Ild. at 216.
159 See Brest, suvora note 154, at 5.
160 Id. at 48.
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identification and affiliation only to assure justice for individual
members.
161
In sum, the anti-discrimnation principle rejects "[tihe notion that the
treatment of individuals as a group for malign purposes requires their
treatment as a group for bemgn compensatory purposes."162
2. The Group-Disadvantaging Pnncple-Caste
OwenFiss advancedwhat he alledthe "group-disadvantaging" theory
of equal protection in his well-known article "Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause."'63 Fiss's concern is with practices that aggravate the
subordinate position of a "specially disadvantaged group,"
paradigmatically blacks."6 In contrast to the anti-discrimination principle,
Fiss's theory is explicitly group-onented. Fiss explains that one of the
reasons blacks fall within the parameter of the Equal Protection Clause is
because they are a "social group"' 65 -a social entity with a "distinct
existence apart from its members"'--that "has been in a position of
perpetual subordination," and whose "political power is severely
circumscribed."' 67 Fiss further explains that the Equal Protection Clause is
not concerned with the effect of laws on particular individuals. What is
critical under the group-disadvantaging theory is that a law or practice
aggravates or perpetuates the subordinate position of a specially disadvan-
taged group. Fiss writes: "[T]he Equal Protection Clause should be viewed
as a prohibition against group-disadvantaging practices, not unfair
treatment [A] claim of individual unfairness [should be] put to one
161 Id.
162 Id. at 51.
163 Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF 107, 147 (1976).
'64 See id. at 147 For a more modem explication of the group-disadvantaging
principle, see Sunstem, supra note 8, at 2410. Simply put, Professor Sunstem's
"anticaste principle" holds that"no group may be made into second-class citizens."
Id. at 2429. See also Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Prnciple, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996).
'65Fiss, supra note 163, at 154.
,MId. at 148. This, along with what Fiss calls "interdependence"--his notion
that "[tihe identity and well-being of the members of the group and the identity and
well-being of the group are linked"--are in his view the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of a social group. Id.
1671d. at 154-55.
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side. ,,I68 Moreover, the theory applies only to "natural classes" or
groups. 169 Fiss explains that "the Equal Protection Clause. [does not
extend to] what nught be considered artificial classes, those created by a
classification or criterion embodied in a state practice or statute." 170
While Fiss's theory, like other group-oriented theories, assumes that it
is permissible to have unequal distribution of welfare among individuals,
it holds that it is unjust for one racial or ethmc group to be substantially
worse off than others. Thus, unlike the anti-discrimnation principle, the
group-disadvantaging principle is essentially indifferent to the history that
led to the unequal distribution. Fiss proposes a purely redistributive
principle that requires relief for any group that constitutes a "perpetual
underclass. 171 Members ofthe group maypartake of the remedy regardless
ofwhether they were in fact harmed by the state action; they are essentially
takng as representatives of their groups. Fiss's redistributive strategy
would, in his view, "give expression to an ethical view against caste, one
that would make it undesirable for any social group to occupy a position of
subordination for any extended period of time."172
B. Process Theories
The oft-quoted footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products"
is the cornerstone of the "process theory" of equal protection."7 As John
Hart Ely explains:
In arepresentative democracy value determinations are to be made by our
elected representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we can vote
them out of office. Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving
of trust, when . though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote,
representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically
disadvantaging some minority out of snple hostility or a prejudiced
1681d. at 160.
169 Id. at 148.
17 Id. at 156.
171 Id. at 150.
'7Id. at 151.17 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
174 See id. at 152-53 n.4 ("Nor need we enquire whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, wich tends seriously
to curtail the operations of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry.").
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refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that
minority the protection afforded other groups by a representative
system. 175
A process theory is concerned with the political role played by prejudices
and stereotypes about the moral inferiority of the targeted group. The
concern is that these prejudices either prevent certain groups from
participating in the political processes or result in morally objectionable
legislative and executive actions or rules based on fundamentally false
premises.
Under the process theory, the courts serve as a means of correcting
special lands of malfunctions m the political process, such as discrimina-
tory treatment of so-called "suspect" classes. Ely maintains that a suspect
class is a "discrete and insular"' 76 minority that is "barred from the
pluralist's bazaar, and thus keeps finding itself on the wrong end of the
legislature's classifications, for reasons that in some sense are discredit-
able."'" The process theory holds that only those groups unable to protect
themselves through the political process are entitled to heightenedjudicial
scrutiny of laws disadvantaging them. They are "relegated to such a
position ofpoliticalpowerlessness asto command extraordinary protection
from the majoritanan political process."'178 Ely does not consider women
"discrete and insular," therefore, as they have extensive, close contact with
men and constitute a majority of the voting population.
79
C. The Anti-Differentiation Principle
The concern with stigma, caste and process has given way m equal
protection jurisprudence to a broader conception of "treating likes alike."
Twentieth century equal protection jurisprudence has been dominated by
this "anti-differentiation principle," which asks whether people who are
similarly situated have been treated similarly The "class of one" cases
unplicate this theory of equal protection, as individuals complain that they
have been treated differently from all others who are "similarly situated."
175 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (1980).
176 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
177 ELY, supra note 175, at 152.
178 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodnguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
179 ELY, supra note 175, at 164. Ely's theory has been criticized for being too
narrow in this regard. See, e.g., Olga Popov, Towards a Theory of Underclass
Review, 43 STAN. L. REV 1095, 1097-98 (1991).
[-VOL. 89
"CLASSES OF ONE"
This portion of the Article discusses the anti-differentiation principle
thoroughly, as it is the most relevant of the four primary theories of equal
protection.
In explicating the anti-differentiation principle, the Supreme Court has
generally required that discriinmatory state legislation must be based upon
"reasonable classifications." The Court has struggled, however, to precisely
define the parameters of permissible government discrimnation. In its
modem equal protection jurisprudence, the Court has focused primarily
upon (1) the "rationality" of the government's distinction, and (2) the
"purpose" of that distinction.
1. Minimum Rationality
Since 1949, when Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek published
their leading article on "The Equal Protection of the Laws,"180 the core
concept in equal protection theory has been the idea that equal protection
requires the equal treatment of"similarly situated" persons.8 11 As Tussman
and tenBroek explain:
The essence of [the Equal Protection Clause] can be stated with
deceptive simplicity. The Constitution does not require that tungs
different m fact be treated m law as though they were the same. But it
does require, m its concern for equality, that those who are similarly
situated be similarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a
classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those
similarly situated.'
The Supreme Court regularly articulates this "likes must be treated as
likes," or anti-differentiation, theory of equality in its equal protection
jurisprudence,"' and other scholars have carried it forward and refined the
theory within constitutional scholarship.TM
18 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The EqualProtection ofthe Laws, 37
CAL. L. REv 341 (1949).
"I Id. at 344.
,-Id. (footnote omitted).
183 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985) ("The Equal Protection Clause is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.") (citing Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216
(1982)).
114 See, e.g., Kenneth W Simons, Overinclusion and Undernclusion: A New
Model, 36 UCLA L. REV 448,456-60 (1989).
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It is a truism that all laws classify.' Equal protection, according to the
anti-differentiation principle, requires that such classifications have a
certain relation to the purpose ofa particular law The rule is usually stated
as requiring that a classification be rationally related to legitimate
government purposes."8 6 As Tussman and tenBroek characterize it, the
Equal Protection Clause embodies a principle of "reasonable classifica-
tion."
187
The Supreme Court's earliest standard for legislative and administra-
tive classifications, as applied to government regulation of socioeconomic
matters, required simply that there be like treatment of those engaged in the
regulated activities.' This narrow view of the anti-differentiationprinciple
was found to be unworkable, as entities within the class who were treated
differently were by their nature not "the same."189
The anti-differentiation principle, as developed m the Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence, requires that legislative enactments and
executive acts' 91 meet the basic requirement ofmininum rationality Equal
protection requires "some rationality in the nature of the class singled
"8' See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 39 (1982) (Rehnquist, I., dissenting) ("All
laws classify, and, unremarkably, the characteristics that distinguish the classes so
created have been judged relevant by the legislators responsible for the
enactment."); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979)
('Most laws classify, and many affect certain groups unevenly, even though the
law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the class described
by the law."); see also Michael . Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization andAppraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv 1023, 1068 (1979) ("Every
time an agency of government formulates a rule--m particular, every time a
legislature enacts a law-it classifies.").
186 See, e.g., San Antoio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973)
("A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause
affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which
requires only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational relationship
to legitimate state purposes.").
187 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 180, at 344.
.88 See Powell v. Pennsylvama, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888) (holding that no
regulatory provisionwas repugnantto equal protection so long as it"place[d] under
the same restrictions, and subject[ed] to like penalties and burdens, all who
[were] embraced by its prohibitions.").
'8 9 See TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1440.
191 t has long been established that the Equal Protection Clause extends to all
state action that demes equal protection, including actions of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. See Virgina v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318
(1880).
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out,"191 with rationality tested by the classification's ability to serve the
purposes intended by the legislative or administrative rule. In other words,
"[t]he courts must reach and determine the question whether the classifica-
tions drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose."'' 9
The government may determine that it is in the public interest to treat
the mentally ill differently from the mentally retarded, i3 widowed spouses
who marry before age sixty differently than those who marry after sixty,194
and plastic milk containers differently than paperboard containers. " '5 The
Equal Protection Clause requires that the government justify its choice of
which classes are subjected to regulation. The minimum rationality
standard is extraordinarily deferential to the legislature's determination of
"fit" between the classes chosen and the governmental purpose. The
Supreme Court has generally upheld state classifications when applying
rational basis review to equal protection challenges. 19 Indeed, under
rational basis review the Court has been willing to uphold classifications
so long as they are supported by any conceivable basis, whether that basis
has been articulated by the legislature or not. 197
2. illicit Purpose
Although the fit between legislative means and ends has been the
dominant approach and has resulted, on rare occasions, in laws being
stricken for lack ofa rational basis, the Supreme Court has also invalidated
legislative classifications based upon the illegitimatepurpose behind the
classification. This review of governmental purpose has gained currency
191 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966).
19 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
193 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321-28 (1993).19 Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340,348-50 (1986).
1 9 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,461-70 (1981).
"9 See TRiBE, supra note 6, at 1443 (stating that the rationality requirement is
"largely equivalent to a strong presumption of constitutionality").
'97 See id., see also Kimel v. FlondaBd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,646 (2000)
("The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not require
States to match age distinctions and the legitimate interests they serve with
razorlike precision."). The Supreme Court has been reluctant to strike down state
laws under rational basis review. See Robert C. Farrell, SuccessfulRational Basis
Claims in the Supreme Court From the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32
IND. L. REV. 357 (1999) (noting that during the past twenty-five years, the
Supreme Court has invalidated laws under the rationality test on only ten occasions,
while rejecting such claims in one hundred cases).
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
in approximately the past three decades.198 Indeed, m some instances it
appears to have sharper teeth than the traditional means/ends review.199
The Supreme Court has invalidated classifications because of
illegitimate purposes mtwo categones of cases. The first category consists
of classifications that favor in-state interests to those of "outsiders." In
Zobel v. Williams,00 for example, the Supreme Court struck down as
irrational an Alaska statute that distributed income from the state's natural
resources based upon the year in which residency was established. 0 1 The
Court has held that such categorizations, which favor politically powerful
"permanent classes" of residents over out-of-state interests, are motivated
by a bare desire to mjure unrepresented outsiders. A motivation to benefit
m-state interests or, conversely, to harm outsiders, is not a constitutionally
rational basis for classifying groups.2" Professor Sunstem has labeled ill
motives of this sort 'naked preferences."2 3
The second category of enactments invalidated by the Court for lack
of a legitimate purpose are those in which a politically powerless or
margmalized group has been singled out for unfair treatment.2 4 These
"naked preferences" look very much like classifications based upon race
and gender, which courts have subjected to more exacting scrutiny,
although the Court has refrained from invoking its "suspect" or "quasi-
suspect" classificationjunsprudence to strike them down. The earliest case
was United States Department of Agrtculture v. Moreno,2°5 in which the
19 See D. Don Welch, Legitimate GovernmentPurposes andStateEnforcement
ofMorality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv 67, 83-84 (stating that inqury into legitimacy of
legislative purpose did not begin until the 1970s). For a discussion ofthe difficulty
ofascertammg legislative purpose, see generally WilliamN. Eskndge, Jr. & Phillip
P. Fnckey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era,
48 U. PrrT. L. REv.,691, 702-03 (1987).
199 See Daniel A. Crane, Faith, Reason, and Bare Animosity, 21 CAMPBELL L.
REV 125, 139-46 (1'999) (discussing 'Bare Animosity Review).20 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1582).
201 Id. at 63.
202 See generally Hooper v Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985)
(invalidating New Mexico law that granted tax exemption to Vietnam Veterans
only if they had resided in state prior to specified date); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (striking down Alabama tax on out-of-state
insurance compames that was higher than tax levied against in-state entities).
203 See Cass R. Sunstem, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REv 1689 (1984).
204 See Crane, supra note 199, at 139-46.
2 United States Dep't of Agnc. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the federal Food Stamp Act
of 1964 that was intended to prevent "hippies" and "hippie communes"
from participating in the food stamp program. Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, stated: "[I]fthe constitutional conception of 'equal protection
of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest."'
The Supreme Court revisited its "naked animosity" approach mPlyler
v. Doe,2°7 a case involving a Texas statute that prohibited children of illegal
immigrants from attending public schools. The Court determined that the
State's purported justifications for the statute were mere subterfuge, and
that the purpose of the classification was to punish the children of illegal
immigrants for their parents' status. It characterized the Texas law as an
effort to impose "a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not
accountable for their disabling status."2 '8 The Court refused to recogmze
such naked animosity as a legitimate governmental purpose, and insisted
that the State "do more than justify its classification with a concise
expression of an intention to discriminate" against the children of illegalimmigrants. 209
The Supreme Court has granted similar protection under the Equal
Protection Clause to the mentally retarded. In City ofCleburne v. Cleburne
Lzvng Center,210 the Court determined that m refusing to grant a special use
permit for the operation ofa group home for the mentally retarded, the city
was motivated by "negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable m a zoning proceeding."' I Under the Equal
Protection Clause, the State must steer clear of its "private biases" and act
solely in the public interest.2 2
Most recently, in Romer v. Evans," the Supreme Court invalidated a
Colorado constitutional amendment passed by referendum which would
have prohibited the State of Colorado or any of its political subdivisions
from
adopt[ing] or enfore[ing] any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual onentation, conduct, practices
2N Id. at 534.
7 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
20 1 Id. at 223.
209 Id. at 227 (citation omitted).
220 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
21 1 Id. at 448.
212 Id. (citing Palmore v Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
213 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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or relationslups shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
2 14
In his majority opinion striking down the Colorado constitutional amend-
ment, Justice Kennedy stated: "A law declaring that in general it shall be
more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from
the government is itself a demal of equal protection of the laws in the most
literal sense."2 5 Justice Kennedy invoked the spirit of the Equal Protection
Clause, as well as the text ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, in striking down
the Colorado amendment. The Court determined that the Colorado
amendment violated the naked animosity principle because it "ralse[d] the
inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of ammosity
toward the class of persons affected." 216 In other words, the Colorado
amendment was born of a naked desire to harm gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals.
In these "bare animosity" cases, the Supreme Court invalidated laws
not because the legislature did not formulate a tight "fit" between its means
and ends, but rather because the ends themselves were forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause. In a nation of equal laws, a naked desire to harm
a.particular group of people is a constitutionally illegitimate purpose.
Simply put, the State cannot single out a group of people for adverse
treatment solely because it does not like them, at least, the Court has
indicated, when the group singled out is politically unpopular and lacks the
political wherewithal to defend itself from vindictive lawmakers.
V. "CLASSES OF ONE" AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Far from being pre-determinmed by prior precedent, Olech appears to be
at odds with a century of equal protection jurisprudence. A "class of one"
is no class at all, at least not as that term has been defined by the Supreme
Court. The Court's jurisprudence reflects the history of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, which is bound up with notions of group treatment, and has
never been considered a tool for adjudicating claims of individual
mistreatment.2 17 Thus, contrary to Olech, there is no doctrinal basis for
214 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, invalidated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).215 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
216 Id. at 634.
217 See supra notes 152-216 and accompanying text.
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treating an individual white male as protected under the Equal Protection
Clause.
A "class of one" consisting solely of a disappointed white male plainly
does not implicate the anti-caste concern that animated the framers of the
Equal Protection Clause. Nor does such a "class" raise concerns for
defending the politically powerless against negative stereotyping or
differentiation by the government on some illegitimate basis, such as
sexual orientation or mental capacity, as in more recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence.2
The only possible theoretical underpinning for invoking the clause on
behalf of such a "class" is the anti-differentiation principle, winch requires
at a mmunum that the government state a rational reason for its line-
drawing or differentiating principle-its "classification." As explained
below, however, while the anti-differentiation theory holds out some
surface appeal in support ofthe "class of one" cases, upon closer examnna-
tion this theory also fails to provide an adequate foundation for applying
the Equal Protection Clause to individuals who are disappointed by the
decisions of their local officials.
A. The Rights of "Persons" or Groups?
In the process of opening federal courthouse doors to individual claims
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Olech Court failed to consider even
basic principles. To determine whether individual claims of mistreatment
are covered under the Equal Protection Clause, it is necessary in the first
instance to examine who or what is the object of the protection afforded
under the Equal Protection Clause. Does the Equal Protection Clause
protect individual persons, groups of individuals, or both?
Perhaps the most common understanding of the purpose of the clause
is that it protects blacks and other minority classes from racial or ethnic
stereotyping or, worse, outright racism. As Chief Judge Posner pointed out
m Indiana State Teachers Ass'n, however, the Equal Protection Clause
"does not speak of classes," and, in Judge Posner's view, "[a] class,
moreover, can consist of a single member."2 19 As demonstrated in Part II,
the drafters of the Equal Protection Clause were burdened with far more
serious concerns at the time the clause was drafted than whether an
2 S8 ee supra notes 163-216 and accompanying text.
229 Indiana State TeachersAss'nv. IndianapolisBd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996).
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individual could bring a viable action under its language. They simply
never considered the issue.
Despite its statement in Olech that its cases "have recogmzed" such
claims, the Supreme Court has never been presented with the issue of
whether individual claims of mistreatment are properly the subject of the
Equal Protection Clause.' The Court has, however, made the same
seemingly axiomatic textual observation made by Chief Judge Posner in
Esmail-that the clause speaks interms of "persons"--m City ofRichmond
v. JA. Croson Co.,12 and, more recently, inAdarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena.m2
In Croson, the Court invalidated a plan adopted by the Richmond City
Council that required. prime contractors to whom the city awarded
construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar
amount of the contract to one or more "Minority Business Enterprises." In
settling upon strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard by which to judge
classifications drawn m favor of minorities, the Court rejected the
argument that classifications that seek to benefit minorities should be
subjected to lesser scrutiny than those that seek to disadvantage them. To
emphasize its commitment to color-blindness, the Court reiterated that
"'the rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are,
by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are
personal rights.' " In Adarand, the Court invalidated federal highway
I The Court cited only two cases that it claimed had "recognized" class of one
claims under the Equal Protection Clause. One of the cases the Court relied upon,
AlleghenyPittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm "n of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336
(1989), involved not an individual claim of mistreatment but claims on behalf of
a group of property owners, who alleged that a tax assessor had assessed their
property differently from the property of those similarly situated based upon an
improper characteristic shared only by petitioners' properties. That is not a "class
of one" scenario, but is rather the sort of systematic line-drawing with which the
Equal Protection Clause has always been concerned. The other case, Sioux City
Bridge Co. v. Dalinta County, Neb., 560 U.S. 441,446 (1923), is a remnant of the
Court's earliest efforts to articulate a rationality standard. See supra notes 188-89
and accompanying text. Sioux City was another dispute over tax assessments, in
wich the Court treated all taxpayers as belongingto asingle "class," and found the
possibility ofdifferential treatment of one class member-Sioux City-implicated
principles of equal protection. Sioux City, 560 U.S. at 446.
• City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948)).
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contract set-asides for minority business enterprises. In the course of
rejecting the idea of "bemgn" federal racial classifications, the Court
declared it a "basic principle" that the Equal Protection Clause "protects
persons, not groups," and went on to identify the right to equal protection
as a "personal right." 4 If the object of the clause is to protect "persons"
and is in fact concerned only with "personal rights," perhaps the Equal
Protection Clause provides an individual, regardless of race, gender or
other group characteristic, a federal constitutional remedy for unfair
treatment at the hands of local officials.
As noted, in Olech the Supreme Court did not so much as mention the
text of the Equal Protection Clause. Nor, despite the fact that its statements
in Adarand and Croson appear on their face to support the principle that
class or group characteristics are irrelevant under the Equal Protection
Clause, did the Olech Court rely upon those statements. Careful observa-
tion of the context in which the Supreme Court articulated this individualis-
tic approach to equal protection demonstrates why the Court did not even
citeAdarand and Croson. Those cases do not stand for the proposition that
the object of equal protection is the individual, wholly separate and apart
from any group to which he or she belongs. Indeed, when considered in
context, the Court's comments go in the opposite direction.
It is critical to recognize that m Croson and Adarand the Supreme
Court was addressing the issue of affirmative action, an issue that presents
"the tension between the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
treatment of all citizens, and the use of race-based measures to ameliorate
the effects of past discrimnation on the opportunities enjoyed by minority
groups in our society "m The principal issue before the Court in Croson,
and later in Adarand, was whether affirmative action policies were to be
subjected to the same "strict scrutiny" as other race-based classifications.
In explaining its answer in the affirmative, the Court said in Croson and
Adarandthat equalprotectionrights are personal insofar as the government
may not use race as the sole criterion in public decision-making, whether
distributing benefits or burdens, absent some very compelling reason (i.e.,
remedying the effects ofpast or current discrmnation26). After comment-
24Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227
2 Croson, 488 U.S. at 476-77
2 As the Supreme Court held in Croson, however, "an amorphous claim that
there has been past discrimination m a particular industry cannot justify the use of
an unyielding racial quota." Id. at 499. If the government is to use race at all, it
must have evidence that the scope of the remedy it proposes is limited in some
reasonable sense to the injury it wishes to redress. See id.
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ing that the Equal Protection Clause "protects persons, not groups," the
Court explained:
It follows from that principle that all governmental action based on
race-a group classification long recognized as "in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited," should be subjected to detailed
judicial mquiiy to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the
laws has not been infringed. These ideas have long been central to tlus
Court's understanding of equal protection, and holding "bemgn" state and
federal racial classifications to different standards does not square with
them.3
In other words, the government is generally prohibited from using race or
other class-based characteristics as a proxy. In the affirmative action
context, a white person has a "personal right" not to be punished because
oflus skn color for past discrimiation that is unidentified, unproven, and,
therefore, unconnected to him. Thus, under Croson and Adarand, it is the
individual's differential treatment based on his race that implicates the
Equal Protection Clause.
The import of the Supreme Court's individualistic approach to equal
protection in affirmative action cases is that even correctivejustice must be
color-blind. Non-victims should not benefit, and non-sinners should not
pay. Equal protection rights are "personal" only insofar as the purpose of
the clause is to make the individual, and not the group, whole. However,
what the clause reaches, and sometimes forbids, in the first instance is
group-disadvantaging governmental action. In other words, the clause is
remedially personal msofar as remedies are fashioned to fit individual
cases, to reward victims and to punish wrongdoers, but underpinning this
individualistic approach is the notion that the government generally may
not disadvantage members of a class or group solely because they share
some common characteristic. To borrow Professor Brest's succinct
explanation, the Supreme Court rejects the "notion that the treatment of
individuals as a group for malign purposes requires their treatment as a
group for benign compensatory purposes."22
B. There is Not Always a "Class"
The language of the Equal Protection Clause settles nothing with
regard to "class of one" cases. While it is the individual "person" who is
22
7 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (quoting Hirabayashi v United States, 320 U.S.
81, 100 (1943)).
2n See Brest, supra note 154, at 51.
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benefitted or harmed by government action in any particular case, the
Equal Protection Clause has always been concerned with group or class
distinctions? 9 Whatever other conclusions one might draw from the
ratification debates, it is beyond dispute that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause were principally concerned with
eradicating the caste discrimination visited upon blacks m the post-Civil
War era.i 0 It is also beyond debate that, whatever the intentions of the
fi-amers with regard to the scope of the Equal Protection Clause, the
Supreme Court long ago expanded the list of "suspect" or "quasi-
suspect" classifications to include those based upon gender and Megiti-
macy . 3 All other classifications are subjected to so-called "rational basis"
review, which means either that the Court will analyze the degree of
"fit" between government means and ends a2 or, in a small but growing
subset of cases, will invalidate a law that the Court deems to have an
illegitimate purpose, i.e., an intent to disadvantage a politically powerless
group. 
3
In sum, judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is inextricably bound up with notions of group
characteristics. It is the state's proxy, or broad generalization, that is
subjected to scrutiny under the clause.
In this respect, the Equal Protection Clause is quite different from other
provisions of the Bill of Rights. It is clear, for example, that the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded to"persons" under the
Fourth AmendmentP does not depend on group membership or status. The
same is true of the rights against double jeopardy and self-incriinuation
I See supra notes 152-228 and accompanying text.
1o See supra notes 122-51 and accompanying text.
23 See ERWIN CHEMERiNSKY, CONSTITUTONALLAW: PRINCIPLES ANDPOLICIES
§§ 9.4, 9.6 (1997).
" See id. at 541-45 (describing the "reasonable relationslup" requirement of
the rational basis test).
13 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(invalidating, under the rational basis test, a zoning ordinance that prevented the
operation of a home for the mentally retarded).
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, butuponprobable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
afforded the "person" under the Fifth Amendment.3 The Equal Protection
Clause is different, however, because it addresses the unique wrong of
discminuation.
Professor Sunstem explained this point in his recent booky 6 With
regard to the individualistic text of the Equal Protection Clause ("any
person"), he states:
To be sure, "any person" may complain that a classification is constitu-
tionally unacceptable. But on what grounds can "any person" seek special
judicial assistance? Under the equal protection clause, all clais of
constitutional discrimination are necessarily based on complaints about
treatment that singles out a characteristic sharedby a group. . The issue
is whether the government's use of that particular shared characteristic is
disfavored from the constitutional point of view. There is no serious
question about whether the characteristics of which "any person" may
complain are shared characteristics; of course they are. In this sense,
clais of unconstitutional discrimination are always claims about the
government's impermissible useofsome group-based characteristic, even
if those claims are made by "anyperson."23
7
In sum, the essence of the Equal Protection Clause is the prohibition of
group-based discrimination.
Nearly all of the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence
addresses legislative classifications. The legislature draws classifications
based, hopefully, on some reasoned distinction aimed at serving a lawful
purpose. By contrast, not all administrative decisions construct a we/they
line capable of meamngful judicial review. This is particularly true in the
"class of one" cases. In these cases the charge is that a government official
has singled out an individual who does not belong to any group, vulnerable
or otherwise, for unfair treatment. There has, quite simply, been no effort
23 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, m relevant
part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.
U.S. CONST. amend. V
2 3 6 CAS5 R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
13Id. at 125-26.
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whatsoever to draw a line based upon some purportedly relevant distin-
gishing characteristic. Consequently, there is no "classification" as that
term has been interpreted and applied in equal protection jurisprudence and
scholarship.
Despite the absence of any effort to classify for the purpose of
enforcement of the law, Esmail and the other cases in which courts
confronted individual claims ofvmdictive action priorto Olech determined
that the absence of competing groups did not take the Equal Protection
Clause out of play. 8 The First and Second Circuits did not state explicitly
why the absence of an identifiable group characteristic did not foreclose
review under the Equal Protection Clause. At least m its most recent "class
of one" precedents, the Seventh Circuit ventured a two-pronged answer to
this doctrinal dilemma. Its textual answer was discussed in the preceding
section. The court's second point was that "[a] class, moreover, can consist
of a single member. ' 9 Indeed, according to Chief Judge Posner: "There
is always a class."21° In Esmail, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff's
suit was not "barred by the 'class of one' rule, because there is no such
rule."24 In Olech, the Supreme Court accepted this principle as well settled.
There are several problems with the notion that "there is always a
class" for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, or, stated differently,
that the alleged discrimination creates the class. The first is a matter of
simple definition. Classes and castes are group separators. Individuals are
sorted into one class or another based upon some characteristic, like skin
color or gender, that they share with other members of the same group.242
us See, e.g., Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining
that an individual ought to have a remedy under the Equal Protection Clause).
"9 Indiana State Teachers Ass'nv. Indianapolis Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996).
2AId.
241Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180.
242 See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 248-49 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "class" as "[a] group of persons,
things, qualities, or activities, having common characteristics or attributes," and
"classification" as an "[a]rrangement into groups or categories on the basis of
established critena"). Similar class concepts animate the definition of
"discriminate." See supra note 102 and accompanying text. It may be argued that
my approach to "classes" requires courts to draw difficult lines from time to time.
Are two people enough to institute a "class," or three? In most cases m which there
has been discrimination based on group or shared characteristics, the classification
will be clear. The point is that equal protection provides a "personal" right to be
free from invidious group or class discrimination based on shared characteristics
2000-2001]
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Consistent with this definition of class, all of the equal protection
theories-anti-subjugation, group-disadvantaging, process, and anti-
differentiation-have as their focus the treatment of one group vis-a-vis
another.243 The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence mediates
these group controversies generally by reviewing the legislature's
classifications under the "rational basis" review for proper fit, and
occasionally for improper purpose, and uses "strict scrutiny" only to
mvalidate those classifications based upon a "suspect" characteristic.2
Priorto Olech, the Supreme Court had not squarely addressed whether
an individual can constitute a "class" for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause. With few exceptions, the Supreme Court's equal protection cases
have involved either legislative line-drawmg that places different groups
on opposite sides of a chosen line, or executive action, such as criminal
prosecution, that targets a particular class or group.245 The Seventh Circuit
"class of one" cases nowhere mentioned any of the numerous Supreme
Court precedents that describe the Equal Protection Clause as a benchmark
for judging the validity of governmental groupings of individuals. In
Indiana State Teachers Ass', the Seventh Circuit relied on Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services,2' a case involving a legislative
enactment concerning the treatment to be afforded to former President
Nixon's presidential materials, including certain tape recordings that were
m danger ofbemg destroyed. The Supreme Court held that President Nixon
was a "legitimate class of one" 247 such that Congress's enactment singling
out his papers did not constitute an unconstitutional "bill of attainder.1248
The Nixon case is readily distinguishable on the ground that it did not
that are arbitrary or irrelevant.
243 See, e.g., Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 180, at 344-53.
2* See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23 1, at 529-31. See also Kimelv. Florida Bd.
of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,645-47 (2000) (holding that age classifications do not
involve a historically subjugated minority, and are thus appropriately subject only
to rational basis review).245 See infra notes 283-309 and accompanying text.
246 Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
247 Id. at 472.
SU.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, ci. 3. This clause provides: "No Bill of Attamder or
ex post facto Law shall be passed." Id. Abill ofattamder is "a law that legislatively
determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without
provision of the protections of ajudicial trial." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468 (emphasis
added). President Nixon initially challenged the act as violative of both the Equal
Protection Clause and the prohibition on bills of attainder. However, he abandoned
the equal protection agreement before the Supreme Court. Id. at 471 n.33.
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involve a claim ofunfair treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, but
rather an allegation of an unconstitutional '"Bill of Attainder," which
singles out an individual or group for special puishment. Given that the
Court was not even discussing the Equal Protection Clause and classifica-
tions challenged pursuant to that clause, Nixon is thin support indeed for
the statement that "there is always a class" under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The other cases cited by the Seventh Circuit demonstrate the group-
focus of the clause. The court cited City ofNew Orleans v. Dukes,249 which
involved not a "class of one," but a muicipal ordinance that prohibited all
vendors from selling foodstuffs in Louisiana's French Quarter unless they
had continuously operated their business in that location for eight or more
years.25 The city, thus, drew a line separating the group of long-standing
vendors from those who had operated their businesses for less than the
purportedly relevant time period. Thus, Dukes set up a classic Equal
Protection Clause mquiry regardingthe legislative "fit" between means and
ends.
In search of some support for its theory of equal protection, the Seventh
Circuit stated in Esmail that City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.' "implied" that an individual ought to have a remedy under the Equal
Protection Clause where he is subjected to vindictive governmental
action . 2 The Court's concern in City of Cleburne, however, was not with
unfair treatment visited upon an individual, but rather with a legislative
classification that singled out mentally retarded persons as a group and
placed them, based upon unwarranted stereotypes, under restrictions not
borne by members of the majority group.P
Far from "implying" support for "class of one" equal protection
cases, prior to Olech the Supreme Court had strongly suggested that it
would reject the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that a "class" for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause can be "defined by reference to the discn-
mination itself."2- In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
249 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiain).
• 'oId. at 298.
21 City of Clebume v. Cleburne Livmg Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
1 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995).
1 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (explaining that the ordinance shows "an
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded" while noting that fraternity and
sorority members are not subject to the same treatment).
. Indiana State Teachers Ass'nv. Indianapolis Bd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 199.6).
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Feeney,- the Court held that in order to state a clai under the Equal
Protection Clause, a plaintiffmust do more than demonstrate the disparate
impact of a law; she must also demonstrate that the government official
acted with the intent to discrinmmate. 6 Further, the "intent" required is of
a particular nature when the Equal Protection Clause is invoked: the
decision-maker must have "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.'' Feeney came very close indeed to
stating a "class of one" rule in equal protection cases. The brief per cunam
opinion issued in Olech does not even mention Feeney.
Under the Supreme Court's anti-differentiation principle, as explained
in Feeney, an equal protection clai must be based on intentional
discrimnation against the plaitiff because of membership m a particular
class, not merely on allegations of unfair treatment of the individual. The
Sixth Circuit's Futernick decision is not the only Circuit opinion that
rejected an equal protection claim based on allegations that an individual
was treated unfairly. 58 As noted, prior to Esmail, several of the Seventh
Circuit's own precedents rejected the notion that a "class" can consist of a
single person. 5 9 Some of those opinions cited Feeney for the proposition
that allegations by an individual that the person was treated unfairly or
vindictively do not suffice under the Equal Protection Clause. As the panel
explained in New Burnham Prairie Homes v. Village of Burnham:
2 °
"Discrimination based merely on individual, rather than group, reasons will
not suffice."''2
The Supreme Court has said precisely the same thing in its "selective
enforcement" or "selective prosecution" cases, which, again, are nowhere
mentioned in Olech. "Selective enforcement" is typically a defense raised
to a criminal prosecution, the argument being that the prosecutor has
singled out the individual for differential treatment-prosecution-while
cases against others similarly situated to the defendant have not been
I Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding
Massachusetts law considering veterans for state civil service positions ahead of
non-veterans because purpose of the law was not to exclude women).
256 Id.
-
7 Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
See Futermck v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996).
' 9 See supra note 25 and accompanying cases.
2' New Burnham Prairie Homes v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474 (7th
Cir. 1990).
261 Id. at 1481.
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pursued.262 In Oylerv. Boles,263 the Supreme Court rej ectedplaintiff's claim
that he was selectively prosecuted under a repeat offender statute. The
Court stated:
[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity m enforcement is not im itself
a federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics m this case
might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the
selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Therefore grounds
supporting a finding of a demal of equal protection were not alleged.2M
Thus, m order to prove a claim of selective enforcement, a defendant must
demonstrate that the prosecutor decided to pursue him because of Ins
membership m an identifiable group, his holding of particular religious
beliefs, or some other arbitrary "classification" based on an illegitimate
characteristic.
In Wayte v. United States,265 the Court elaborated further on the
confines of the selective enforcement defense. In Wayte, petitioner was
indicted for failure to register with the Selective Service System.26 He
moved to dismiss the indictment, clatmmg that the Selective Service's
policy of investigating and referring for prosecution only those who were
"vocar' opponents of the registration program violated the Fifth Amend-
ment guarantee of equal protection.267 In response, "the district court
dismissed the indictment on the ground that the Government had failed to
rebut petitioner's prima facie case of selective prosecution."26 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.269 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that in order to prevail on a selective prosecution claim the defendant must
a For a discussion of the defense of selective prosecution, see Karl S. Coplan,
Rethinlang Selective Enforcem ent in the First Amendment Context, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 144 (1984).
1 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
1 Id. at 456 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
20 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
2s6Id. at 603.
267 Id. at 604. Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Pro-
tection Clause, it does contain an equal protection component. See Boiling v
Sharpe, 347U.S. 497,499 (1954) (explaining that"the concepts ofequalprotection
and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive").
m Wayte, 470 U.S. at 604-05 (footnote omitted).
269Id. at 606.
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demonstrate that the prosecution was "deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standardsuch as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification
including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional
rights." '27 Thus, m addition to demonstrating an mpermissible classifica-
tion, defendant may also prevail on a selective prosecution claim if he can
show that Is prosecution violates "protected statutory or constitutional
rights," such as the exercise of First Amendment free speech rights.
The Wayte Court found it "appropriate to judge selective prosecution
clams according to ordinary equal protection standards."2 ' The Court cited
Feeney for the proposition that defendants must demonstrate that the
government official was motivatedby an intent to discrimiate based upon
an illegitimate group characteristic.272 As the Supreme Court held more
than one hundred years ago i Yick Wo v. Hoplans,m3 a defendant may
demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is "directed so
exclusively against a particular class ofpersons . with a mind so unecjual
and oppressive" that the system of prosecution amounts to "a practical
denial" of equal protection ofthe law.274 What was true when Yick Wo was
decided is no less true today- ordinary equal protection standards forbid
illegitimate classifications, but they do not speak to individual claims of
unfair treatment. At least, that was the understanding prior to Olech.
Finally, as further demonstration that a class cannot be defined merely
by the discrimination itself, the Supreme Court has grafted a class-based
animus requirement onto certain federal civil rights laws. The surviving
version of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, for example, prohibits
conspiracies "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws. 2 75 The
Supreme Court has held that an actionable conspiracy under this provision
must evidence "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. 276 As the Court
explained in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,2" it was only by
270 Id. at 608 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
271 Id.
Id. at 608-09.
2 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).274 Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
275 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000).
276 Griffin v. Breckenndge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (emphasis added) (holding
that "§ 1985(3) does not require state action but reaches private conspiracies.
that are aimed at invidiously discrimmatory depnvations of the equal enjoyment
of rights secured to all by law").
27 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1992).
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limiting the civil rights statute to race or other class-based animus that the
Court could avoid "interpreting [the Act] as a general federal tort law.' 278
While the scope of the "other" class-based category remains unsettled, it
is clear that actions under the statute alleging a violation of equal protection
must be based upon invidious class aninus and cannot consist solely of
individual complaints of unfair treatment.279
Contrary to Olech, the notion of classes created with reference to
defining group characteristics has been a critical concept in equal
protection jurisprudence from the beginning. The framers and ratifiers of
the Fourteenth Amendment sought to protect the class of newly freed
slaves from the Black Codes." ° The Supreme Court's jurisprudence
reaffirmed the framers' bedrock, and expanded the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause to cover any classification of citizens utilized by the
government to serve its ends. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
referees group conflicts-between men and women, rich and poor, and
long-standing residents and newly establishedbusmesses--and adjusts the
level of scrutiny it applies based upon the group characteristic the
government relies upon m making the classification. Until Olech, it was
fairly clear that the Equal Protection Clause could not be invoked to
adjudicate individual claims of unfair treatment. As the Court stated in
Plyler v. Doe:281 "[tihe Equal Protection Clause was intended to work
nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based
legislation. 2 Thus, while all laws classify, it is not accurate to state that
there is always a class for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. There
are no castes of one.
C. Separation ofPowers and the Limits ofJudicial Review
There are three fundamental objections to permitting the federal courts
to referee individual claims of mistreatment under standard equal
27 8d. at 268 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102). In Bray, the Supreme Court
held that § 1985(3) does not provide a federal cause of action against persons
obstructing access to abortion clinics. Id.
279 Justice Souter, for example, contends in his opinion in Bray that the other
"class-based" category of § 1985(3) is not limited to race or like classes, but
extends as well to other legislative classifications subject to "rational basis" review
under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence. See id. at 295-96 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).280 See discussion supra Part III.
281 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
2821d. at 213.
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protection doctrine. First, "class of one" cases, or at least those shorn of
any requirement that plaintiff demonstrate a campaign of retaliation or
other intent to mjure, provide no mediating principle for the decision-
maker to employ. Second, as the Sixth Circuit stated in Futernick, "[t]he
sheer number of possible cases is discouraging." 3 Third, if there is to be
a referee in cases of unfair or arbitrary treatment at the hands of state and
local administrators, that task ought to fall to the state courts, who should
judge the dispute under principles of state law.
The Equal Protection Clause by itself provides no workable test for
determining whether there has been a violation of one's equal protection
rights. It has become the responsibility of the courts and commentators to
fashion some rule of decision to be applied when the clause is invoked. We
rely on what Professor Fiss long ago called "mediating principles"
-mediating because they "'stand between' the courts and the Constitu-
tion" and "give meaning and content to an ideal embodied in the text.""2 4
However, as demonstrated, none of the mediating principles of the Equal
Protection Clause-caste, stigma, process, or anti-differentiation-apply
in the "class of one" cases.
8 5
Despite its obvious weaknesses, the "bad faith" or "malice" approach
adopted by the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits at least inposed some
limits on the multitude of executive actions that could be challenged in
federal court under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, Justice Breyer's
concurrence in Olech noted that it was only the "added factor" of ill will
that prevented the "class of one" cases from turning the courts into zonmg
boards of appeal.28 6 In Olech, however, the Supreme Court put subjective
ill will to the side, opining that only arbitrary differential treatment need be
alleged to state a claim.8 7
Olech leaves the courts with no mediating principle whatsoever. The
Seventh Circuit had defended its "vindictive action" theory on the ground
that the "loser" in a zoning contest could not "automatically appeal to the
federal courts on the ground that the decision was arbitrary ,288 That result,
3 Futermck v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1058 (6th Cir. 1996).
Fiss, supra note 163, at 107
5 See discussion supra Part IV
16 Village ofWillowbrookv. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073,1075 (2000) (per cunani).
It is doubtful, however, that even the "added factor" of ammus would serve as
a significant or effective deterrent to lawsuits. If all it takes for a person who has
been demed a benefit to state a claim is an allegation thaf a public official "had it
m for" hun, we should expect such lawsuits to be more common.
2"7 See id. at 1074.
2s Indiana State Teachers Ass'nv. Indianapolis Bd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Chief Judge Posner stated, "would constitutionalize the Admnistrative
Procedure Act and make its provisions binding on state and local govern-
ment and enforceable in the federal courts."289
However, that is precisely the effect of Olech. There is now no
executive or administrative action that is beyond the reach of the Equal
Protection Clause. After Olech, any individual who is disappointed with a
local zoning decision or, indeed, the provision of any municipal service or
benefit, may appeal to the federal courts for redress. The courts must then
decide the equal protection claim "without any guidance other than what
might be thought implicit m the idea of arbitrary governmental action." ' 9
In addition to providing no mediating principle of its own, Olech calls
into question the mediating principles the courts have relied upon to limit
equal protection claims. Employment discrimination and selective
prosecution are just two examples. UnderFeeney, a government employee
who claims to have been wrongfully dismissed may invoke the Equal
Protection Clause. 91 Olech calls into question employment decisions
n9 Id
2Io Id. Remarkably, even after Olech, the Seventh Circuit continues to require
that a "class of one" allege an improper motive m order to state a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause. See Hilton v City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir.
2000). In Hilton, the Seventh Circuit stated:
[W]e gloss "no rational basis" m the unusual setting of "class of one" equal
protection cases to mean that to make out a prima facie case the plaintiff
must present evidence that the defendant deliberately sought to depnve hnm
of the equalprotection of the laws for reasons of apersonal nature unrelated
to the duties of the defendant's position.
Id. at 1008. Without such a requirement, Chief Judge Posner argued, "the federal
courts would be drawn deep into the local enforcement of petty state and local
laws." Id. See also Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 91 F Supp. 2d 1208, 1213 (N.D.
11. 2000) (holding that to prevail on an equal protection claim, plaintiffimust prove
defendants "singled him out" for differential treatment m a spiteful effort to "get"
hun); Singleton v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd., No. 00C395, 2000 WL 777925, at
*10 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2000) (holding that a class of one plaintiff must allege
defendant's actions "were motivated by vindictiveness and spite"); Kevin v.
Thompson, No. 99 C 7882, 2000 WL 549440, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2000)
(dismissing class of one complaint where there was no allegation that decision was
"vindictive, motivated by any illegitimate anunus or caused by subjective ill will").
291 See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1978) (explaining that
"[a]lthough public employment is not a constitutional right any state law
overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over females in public employment
would require an exceedingly persuasivejustification to withstand a constitutional
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause").
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allegedly based upon gender, race, or some other group characteristic.2"
Feeney requires that plaintiffs in such cases prove intentional discrnimma-
tion based upon some group characteristic. However, after Olech, all that
is required is an allegation that plaintiff was dismissed while others
allegedly "similarly situated" were not. In other words, plaintiffs need not
allege, or prove, invidious discrinmmation based on shared characteristics,
but only that they were dismissed, i.e., "discriminated" against, for no
rational reason.
Likewise, the Supreme Court's selective prosecution precedents, which
invoke standard equal protection doctrine, require an allegation of
mistreatment based upon an illegitimate classification, such as religion,
race, or punishment for exercise of a constitutional right.' If, as Olech
suggests, standard equal protection doctrine extends to every allegedly
arbitrary decision made by a government official, an individual may
challenge the decision to prosecute without reference to any improper
classification. Under Olech, there would appear to be no limits to the reach
of the Equal Protection Clause.2" In Professor Fiss's words, "class of one"
cases offer nothing to "'stand between' the courts and the Constitution"
and "to give meaning and content to an ideal embodied in the text.
' 29s
To be sure, an individual who challenges government action as
arbitrary under the deferential "rational basis" test will be unlikely to
2ISee, e.g., Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1151 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that plaintiff that alleged she was dismissed because of her gender m violation of
the Equal Protection Clause "must show intent to discriminate because of her sta-
tus as a female and not because of characteristics of her gender wich are personal
to her").293 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
294 The Fifth Circuit has examined a selective prosecution claim post-Olech. In
Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2000), the court held that "to
successfully bring a selective prosecution or enforcement claim, a plaintiff must
prove that the government official's acts were motivated by improper
considerations, such as race, religion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of a
constitutional right." Id. at 277 (footnote omitted). The Fifth Circuit further opined
that the Supreme Court's opinon in Olech did not alter the requirement that "class
of one" selective prosecution plaintiffs "must assert membership m a larger
protected class." Id. at 277 n.17 That interpretation, however, is contrary to the
plain holding of the Olech opinion, which, like the Seventh Circuit's "vindictive
action" precedents, recognizes an individual's right to equal protection regardless
of any group membership or identification. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,
120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curam).29 Fiss, supra note 163, at 107
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succeed. At least that is true where the decision maker can proffer some
legitimate reason for the action taken. 96 However, the fact that a defense
may be available in most cases does not excuse the expansion of a
constitutional provision to cover every conceivable case. The Supreme
Court has stated that the Constitution and its amendments were intended to
apply to "the large concerns of the governors and the governed. 297 That
intent has been carried out in equal protectionjunsprudence by focusing on
classifications that have effects beyond the confines of disputes over
individual benefits. Subjecting a plaintiff to an eighteen foot easement
differential or failing to timely connect a homeowner's sewage line or pick
up his trash, though actions that are undoubtedly of concern to the
individuals involved, are hardly the type of "large concerns" that should
embroil the federal courts in constitutional questions. Such disputes will
transform the federal courts into overseers of the day-to-day conduct of
local government officials. Further, the Supreme Court has been Ighly
sensitive to the prospect of subjecting government officials to intrusive and
time-consuming lawsuits. In Crawford-El v. Britton,298 for example, the
Supreme Court stated that "there is a strong public interest in protecting
public officials from the costs associated with the defense of damages
actions." 299
In Esmail, Chief Judge Posner argued that claims of mistreatment by
state and local officials called for a federal remedy In closing his opinion,
he noted that: "[a] class of one is likely to be the most vulnerable of all." 3°°
Consider a person, regardless of color, who has the weight of the govern-
ment brought upon him for no reason other than sheer hatred. As Chief
Judge Posner further commented m Esmail: "If the power of government
is brought to bear on a harmless individual merely because a powerful state
or local official harbors a malignant animosity toward him, the individual
ought to have a remedy in federal court."301
Olech does not rest upon orchestrated campaigns of vengeance,
malignant animosity, or even the naked abuse of government power.3 2
296 See, e.g., Wroblewskt v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 459 (7th Cir.
1992) (stating that "[t]he rational basis standard requires the government to win if
any set of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify its classification").
297 Danels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,332 (1986).
298 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
299 Id. at 590.
300 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995).
301 Id. at 179.
" See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1075 (2000) (per
curiain).
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Rather, the decision extends to even the most routine of government
decisions such as the demal of some benefit to which plaintiffbelieves she
is entitled. It sets up the federal courts notjust as zoning boards of appeals,
but rather as arbiters of every wrong allegedly committed by a local
administrator. Every appeal in the zoning context, for example, necessarily
involves some allegation that the board exceeded, abused, or distorted its
legal authority. The breadth of the equal protection doctrine the Supreme
Court accepted as settled in Olech is disconcerting. 03
A weak or ambiguous mediating principle will invite lawsuits. The
Sixth Circuit is not the only court concerned about the "sheer number of
possible cases"3 4 likely to be spawned by the "class of one" precedents.
The Seventh Circuit voiced its own concerns in Olech, stating that "[o]f
course [they were] troubled, as was the district judge, by the prospect of
turning every squabble over municipal services, of which there must be
tens or even hundreds ofthousands every year, into a federal constitutional
case."305 It is not hyperbole to suggest that this will be precisely the effect
of Olech. A plaintiff need only artfully plead in the complamt that an
official acted arbitrarily or irrationally in order to cause that official to
appear and defend against the allegations.
Perhaps even more troubling than the burdens posed by the "class of
one" cases is the federalization of these local disputes between citizens and
303 It was entirely unnecessary in Olech to create a broad new remedy m federal
court for every local wrong. Esmail and other classes of one already have federal
constitutional remedies at their disposal. First, under the Wayte decision, if Esmail
had alleged that the government official sought to "get" him because ofhis exercise
of First Amendment rights (a claim Esmail did not, but could have, made), he
would have stated a valid selective enforcement claim. See Esmail, 53 F.3d at 178.
Thus, at least where the plaintiff is exercising a constitutional right at the time of
the vindictive action, he may invoke the selective enforcement precedents. Further,
the Due Process Clause is the provision that polices fairness between the state and
the individual dealing with the state, regardless of how other individuals in the
same situation may be treated. See supra Part VI. The approach developed in those
cases limits actionable executive action to egregious or outrageous behavior, and
I argue that "class of one" equal protection claims, if they are to be permitted,
ought to be similarly limited.
3o Futermck v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1058 (6th Cir. 1996).
10 Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386,388 (7th Cir. 1998), affd
percunam, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000). See also Hiltonv. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d
1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (warning that without a mediating principle, "the
federal courts would be drawn deep into the local enforcement of petty state and
local laws").
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their government officials. On this point the words of the Seventh Circuit
m Indiana State Teachers Ass'n bear repeating:
The concept of equal protection is trivialized when it is used to subject
every decision made by state or local government to constitutional review
by federal courts. To decide is to choose, and ordinarily to choose
between-to choose one suppliant, applicant, petitioner, protester,
contractor, or employee over another. Can the loser m the contest
automatically appeal to the federal courts on the ground that the decision
was arbitrary and an arbitrary decision treats likes as unlike and therefore
denies the equal protection of the laws? That would constitutionalize the
Adminmistrative Procedure Act and make its provisions binding on state
and local government and enforceable in the federal courts. The
review of such a decision not claimed to violate some other source of
constitutional obligation such as the free speech clause of the. First
Amendment is not the proper business of the federal judiciary, which
would be operating without any guidance other than what might be
thought implicit in the idea of arbitrary governmental action 3 6
It would be difficult to better articulate the primary objections to making
the "class of one" cases the province of the federal judiciary
The federal courts are not the proper fora in which to litigate purely
local disputes. That is particularly so when the principal question posed is
whether the regulator has acted arbitrarily. There are state laws and
procedures upon which to base such a claim. Arbitrary government action
is prohibited and subject to injunction under the common law, and most
states have administrative procedure acts of their own.3 °7 Thus, there is no
compelling reason for the federal judiciary to insert itself into the day-to-
day conduct of local government officials. As the Futernick court
explained:
Those affected by the unfair regulator have recourse to the state political
processes that appointed that regulator m the firstplace. State courts or the
state constitution may provide protection. Absent a breakdown in the
state's normal political process that unfairly affects a protected group or
3" Indiana State Teachers Ass'nv. Indianapolis Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996).
307 See, e.g., Arnold v. Engelbrecht, 518 N.E.2d 237, 239 (Ill. 1987) (holding
that discretionary acts of public official which are arbitrary and capricious are
subject to injunctive relief).
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the exercise of constitutional rights, we can and should trust states to
police adequately their own processes.3
08
In Esmail, the Seventh Circuit asserted, without citation to any authority or
example, that "[a]lthough the courts of Illinois seem to have been perfectly
ready, willing, and able to protect Esmail agaist Mayor Macrane, powerful
state or local officials are not infrequently able to overawe state or local
courts."' To accept that assertion as constitutional doctrine is to make
every matter of state politics the domain of the federal judiciary This
underestimates and deingrates the state and local judiciaries, who ought not
be pushed aside in order that federal constitutional doctrine may be
unnecessarily expanded.
It is iromc that the Supreme Court, which of late has emphasized
principles of federalism and has limited access to federal courts, would
mvite countless claims alleging that the federal constitution has been
violated by local and state government officials.310 In light of its interpreta-
tion of the Due Process Clause, as discussed in the final Part ofthis Article,
it is surprising that the Court did so.
VI. EXPOUNDING A CONSTITUTION-SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Under the Equal Protection Clause, individual claims of mistreatment
should be put to one side; yet, if they are to be permitted under Olech, the
courts will need a mediating principle to apply, lest the federal constitution
swallow whole state processes for adjudicating allegations of executive and
administrative misconduct. A constitutional standard already exists to test
individual claims ofarbitrary executive action. That standard has its origins
in the area of substantive due process, and it permits relief from allegedly
arbitrary government action only in the rarest of circumstances. In that
3o1 Futernck, 78 F.3d at 1059.
3 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995).
310 See, e.g., Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 680-81 (1999) (rejecting implied waiver as a basis for abrogating
states' sovereign immunity and-holding that any waiver of sovereign imunity by
a state must be express); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (holding that
"our federalism" requires that Congress treat states in a manner indicative of their
status as residuary sovereigns); Semmole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72
(1996) (stating that "[e]ven when the Constitution vests m Congress complete law-
making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
Congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
states").
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respect, it stands in stark contrast to the "class of one" approach under
Olech.
A. Substantive Due Process-The Conscience-Shoclang Standard
For more than a century, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,31l not the Equal Protection
Clause, as the constitutional guarantee "intended to secure the individual
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."3 2 Recently, the
Court explained in County of Sacramento v. Lewis313 that "[w]e have
emphasized time and again that '[t]he touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.' 
314
Indeed, the core concept of due process is protection of the individual
against arbitrary action. This is true whether the challenge is to the denial
of fundamental procedural fairness or, as the Lewis Court stated, "in the
exercise of power without any reasonable justification m the service of a
legitimate governmental objective."315 It is with the latter circumstance that
the so-called "substantive due process" doctrine is concerned. InLewis, the
Supreme Court held that a police officer's actions during a high-speed
chase did not violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause
because the officer's conduct did not "shock the conscence. 316 In an
attempt to give content to the "shocks the conscience" standard, the Court
stated that "conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any
311 The Due Process Clause provides m part: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person or life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. "U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
312 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (emphasis added). In Ross
v. Mofftt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), then Justice Rehnquist distinguished the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses by explaining that "'Due process' emphasizes
fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of
how other individuals in the same situation may be treated. 'Equal protection,' on
the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of
individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable." Id. at 609 (emphasis
added).
313 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
3141d. at 845 (quoting Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,558 (1974)). See also
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,331 (1986) ("The touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.").
315 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846.
316Id. at 833.
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government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the
conscience-shocking level."
3 17
Due process in its substantive sense limits what the government may
do both in its legislative and executive capacities. However, in Lewis the
Supreme Court held that the "criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary
differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a govern-
mental officer that is at issue."3 8 In cases involving challenges to
legislation, courts must inquire whether the claimed due process interest is
a fundamental right "deeply rooted m this Nation's history and tradition.
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 319 It is only executive
actions that are subject to the "shocks the conscience" standard.320
The Supreme Court's substantive due process cases involving
executive action emphasize that "only the most egregious official conduct
can be said to be 'arbitrary in the constitutional sense." 32"' The Supreme
Court has explained that only by so limiting the range of potential liability
can the Court recogmze that-as noted by Chief Justice Marshall early in
the development ofjudicial review--"it is a constitution we are expound-
Mng. '3n In Lewis, the Court briefly explained its basis for cabining
executive liability under the federal constitution: "[E]xecutive action
challenges raise a particular need to preserve the constitutional proportions
of constitutional claims, lest the Constitution be demoted to what we have
called a font of tort law."323
B. A "Font" ofAdministrative Law
The "class of one" cases324 inplicate precisely the same concerns.
Individual claims of executive or administrative misconduct under the
Equal Protection Clause threaten to "demote" the constitution to a "font"
317 Id. at 849 (citation omitted). The "shocks the conscience" standard
originated mRochn v. Californa, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where the Court held that
the forced pumping of a suspect's stomach"shocked the conscience." Id. at 172-73.
See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (reiterating that such
conduct "shocked the conscience" and was so "brutal" and "offensive" that it did
not comport with "traditional ideas of fair play and decency").
31 8 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846.
319 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
320 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846.
321 Id. (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
31 M'Culloch v Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
323 Lew, 523 U.S. at 847-48 n.8.
324See discussion supra Part IV
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not of tort, but of adminstrative law. There is no principled reason to allow
such claims to be brought readily in federal court under the Equal
Protection Clause, while limiting the same actions brought under the Due
Process Clause to conduct that "shocks the conscience" oris "egregious." 3 s
Allowing claims of irrational or arbitrary executive and administrative
action to be brought in federal court by classes of one under traditional
equal protection doctrine will supplant state administrative law and, as the
Seventh Circuit itself pointed out in the "vindictive action" cases,
constitutionalize the federal Administrative Procedure Act. 26
Individual challenges to the decisions of state and local executive
officials are plainly the province of the Due Process Clause. However, if
the Court is to interpret the Equal Protection Clause as reaching these
claims, it ought to at least subject them to the same "shocks the con-
science" standard as it does clais of executive misconduct under the due
process guarantee. Like the Due Process Clause, equalprotection "does not
entail a body of constitutional law imposing liability whenever someone
cloaked with state authority causes harm.""27 Only by treating "class of
one" claims in the same manner as those invoking the substantive due
process guarantee can the courts limit these cases to the most egregious and
31 To be sure, the Supreme Court has been wary of expanding liability based
upon the "textual conundrum of substantive due process." John Hamson,
Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV 493, 502
(1997). Thus far, the Court has applied the standard only in cases involving
physical injury to the plaintiff. But it is not necessarily so limited. See Rosalie
Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse ofPower" Has the Court
Taken the Substance Out ofSubstantive Due Process?, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV 313
(1991) (arguing that conduct short of physical abuse may satisfy the "shocks the
conscience" standard). See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)
(explaining that "we 'ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking m this
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended'") (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
But expanding the constitutional proportions of executive and administrative
liability under the Equal Protection Clause merely because it is a more favored
clause is not a principled distinction. Such an expansion creates the same difficulty
the Court has assiduously tried to avoid in its due process cases, and the Equal
Protection Clause is also characterized by "scarce and open-ended" criteria. State
law ought not be supplanted by federal constitutional doctrine, whether the state
law at issue sounds in tort or admunistrative law.
326 See Indiana State Teachers Ass'nv. Indianapolis Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 101
F.3d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996).
327Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848.
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arbitrary conduct, thereby preserving the proper constitutional propor-
tions.
328
As the Second Circuit stated m a case involving a substantive due
process challenge to a zoning decision similar to that in Olech:
Substantive due process is an outer limit on the legitimacy of governmen-
tal action. It does not forbid governmental actions that might fairly be
deemed arbitrary or capricious and for that reason correctable in a state
court lawsuit seelang review of administrative action. Substantive due
process standards are violated only by conduct that is so outrageously
arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority.329
What the substantive due process guarantee reaches, and what the Equal
Protection Clause ought to be limited to in class of one cases, are govern-
ment officials who abuse their power, or "employ[ ] it as an instrument of
oppression." 330 That standard rightly "points clearly away from liability, or
clearly toward it, only at the ends ofthe [administrative] law's spectrum of
31 From a textual standpoint, there is no reason the courts could not borrow the
"shocks the conscience" standard in equal protection cases challenging arbitrary
executive action. The text of the Due Process Clause nowhere requires that conduct
"shock the conscience" to be actionable. Nor does the Equal Protection Clause on
its face distinguish among "rational," "important," and "compelling" government
interests. These are court-fashioned standards used to limit the reach of broadly
worded constitutional provisions. It should make no difference of constitutional
proportions whether a plaintiff challenging executive action couches his claim in
terms of equal protection'or due process, or whether these claims create a "font"
of tort or administrative law.
329 Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis
added). See also G.M. Eng'rs &Assoc. v. W. Bloomfield Township, 922 F.2d 328,
332 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that local zoning actions violate substantive due
process only if they "shock the conscience"); Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of
Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that "substantive due
process claims should be limited to 'truly irrational' governmental actions [such as]
attempting to apply a zoning ordinance only to persons whose names begin with
a letter in the first half of the alphabet").
330 Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,348 (1986). InRabnovitz v. Rogato, 60
F.3d 906 (1st Cir. 1995), the court cautioned that "routine" claims that a zoning
official acted maliciously "are likely to have rough sailing." Id. at 912. However,
the court allowed the case to proceedbecause, based on the evidence, "a reasonable
jury might well be able to conclude that there was an orchestrated conspiracy
involving a number of officials, selective enforcement, malice, and substantial
harm." Id.
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culpability 331 In that sense, the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits' focus
on "vmdictiveness"--a concerted effort to "get" an individual or an intent
to injure him-correctly, if somewhat inperfectly, limits the constitutional
proportions of these equal protection claims.332 There must, however, be
substantially more than a single act of malice underlying some routine
admiistrative action.
C. The "Bare Animus" Cases
Efforts to "get" an individual through "orchestrated campaign[s] of
vengeance' 333 are the sort of "conduct intended to injure m some way
unjustifiable by any government interest" that is the target of the
conscience-shocking standard.3 It is in such cases that federal remedies
are most appropriate, as the machinery of state or local government has
plainly malfunctioned. All other cases, including routine zoning challenges,
or allegations of a single act of ill will or aninus, ought to be left to the
state courts. Although the Court did not fully explain the
legislative/executive distinction in Lewis, it seems clear that there is a
mediating principle at work. Legislation represents the institutional
judgment of the members of an elected branch of government, while
executive action tends mainly to consist of conduct undertaken by a single
actor. Thus, it is reasonable to impose a different standard on challenges to
executive action than applied to legislative challenges. What the Court is
concerned with under the Due Process Clause is the systematic breakdown
of the governmental function, not random carelessness ornustakes.3 5 Thus,
331 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848. It is unportant to remember, when delineating the
bounds of their liability, that local and state administrators are called on to make
many routine divisions each day. As Cuef Judge Posner noted m Olech, there may
be "tens or even hundreds of thousands" of disputed divisions each year." Olech
v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386,388 (7th Cir. 1998).
332 Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit failed to limit its "no vindictive action"
precedents to instances in whch there has been a systematic malfunction in the
administration of local laws, such as an "orchestrated campaign of official
harassment." Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995).
333 Id. at 178.
334 Lews, 523 U.S. at 849.
335 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM.L.REV. 309,327 (1993) (arguing
that due process law anus to "ensure that governmental lawbreaking does not reach
intolerable levels" and that "this. ambition is more clearly implicated in
challenges to rules and legislation than in individual tort actions").
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it is not the isolated act of denying an individual a permit, even if that
denial is based on ill will, that deserves constitutional rebuke, but rather the
concerted effort or pattern of seeking vengeance or retaliation against the
individual.336 Carrying this distinction over to the "class of one" equal
protection cases, it maybe appropriate to apply traditional notions of equal
protection to legislation that singles out an individual or entity for special
treatment, as tins would constitute, by definition, a systematic deprivation
ofequal protection. However, traditional notions of equal protection would
not apply to run-of-the-mill executive actions, but only to those, like an
orchestrated campaign to punishanindividual, that "shockthe conscience."
Among the difficulties with incorporating the conscience-shocking
standard into equal protection challenges to executive action is the
Supreme Court's reluctance to sanction an investigation of individual
motives under traditional equal protection doctrine. In Olech, the Supreme
Court did not rule out an assessment of motive, but rather declined to
consider whether the Seventh Circuit's "illegitimate ammus" theory was
viable under the Equal Protection Clause. 337 However, Justice Breyer
indicated in his concurrence that the "added factor" of subjective ill will
was necessary to confine the Court's holding to only a limited number of
cases.33 1 Without it, Justice Breyer recognized that courts may well be
presented with the question "whether the simple and common instance of
a faulty zoning decision would violate the Equal Protection Clause. 339
It is true that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to examine the
subjective intent of government officials, particularly legislators, when the
Equal Protection Clause is invoked.3° This reluctance is based at least in
33 See .Michael McGuinness & LisaA. McGuinness Parlagreco, TheReemer-
gence of Substantive Due Process as a Constitutional Tort: Theory, Proof, and
Damages, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV 1129, 1152 (1990) ("While a single incident may
certainly suffice to shock the conscience, perhaps the test is more appropriately
applied to a course of governmental conduct "). See also Christina Brooks
Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV 661,690 (1997) (stating that "what is special about constitutional law, and
distinguishes it from tort, is its concern with institutional power, and therefore with
systemic injustice").
337 See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1075 (2000) (per
cuiam).
331 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
339 Id.
3
1 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,383 (1968) ("The decisions
of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that
the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a
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part on the difficulty inherent m assessing the motivations of a multi-
member legislative body. But as we have seen, the Court sometimes
invalidates government actions under the Equal Protection Clause because
they are motivated by bare, irrational ammus. 1 These "naked preference"
cases support application of the conscience-shocking standard to "class of
one" clais premised upon the Equal Protection Clause, because in such
cases there is no legitimate purpose for the acts committed. Moreover, in
cases involving orchestrated campaigns of official harassment or retalia-
tion, a detailed inquiry into officials' motivations may not be necessary
More often than not, a campaign of vengeance involving a series of
malicious acts will speak for itself.
Democratic outputs should not be frequently set aside solely on the
ground that they were the result of illicit motives.342 Indeed, although the
Equal Protection Clause is frequently invoked to invalidate state laws, the
Court has invalidated only a mere handful of laws based upon illegitimate
purpose. Similarly, it may be assumed that executive conduct that singles
out a person for harsh or retaliatory treatment that is conscience-shocking
or egregious will be an exceptional occurrence. To invalidate decisions in
such isolated circumstances does not interject the courts into the adminis-
trative process other than under the most umque and extraordinary
circumstances, as ajudicial check on government run amok. "Class of one"
cases limited by the "shocks the conscience" standard do not threaten to
embroil federal courts in local disputes of all manner and circumstance. For
example, the doctrine would not reach the run-of-the-mill zoning decision.
Yet, a campaign of retaliation, like a legislative classification that purports
to deny to some group benefits afforded to all others by law, "raise[s] the
inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the [person] affected." 3
The "naked preference" cases and "vindictive action" cases share
another similarity. Bothtypes of cases unplicate theprocess theory ofequal
protection. Chief Judge Posner posited the frightening prospect of an
wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.") (citing McCray
v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)).
34 See supra Part IV.C.2.
342 The Supreme Court has cautioned against "broad ranging" discovery to
determine the subjective good faith of government officials. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982). But it has stopped short of prohibiting
such mquiries, relying instead upon the availability of early dispositive motions to
weed outnon-meritonous claims. See Crawford-Elv. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
341 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (emphasis added).
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
individual who faces alone the vindictive force of the government. 344
Process theory plainly applies in the case of groups like homosexuals and
the mentally retarded. We may presume that their legislative allies are few
or none; hence the need to scrutinize far more carefully the government's
stated purpose in enacting legislation that disfavors these groups. The same
can be said of individuals who complain of vindictive or retaliatory action
by local administrators engaged in an orchestrated conspiracy Although
not part of a vulnerable group that has historically been victimized, these
isolated individuals are indeed "relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritanan political process."345 They are, in Ely's words, disadvantaged
"out of simple hostility "346 What we should be concerned with in the
"vindictive action" cases is a malfunction of the political process in a
special form-not simply the bare animosity or naked hatred of a single
adminstrator in an isolated instance, but rather a concerted effort by
government officials of vengeance or retaliation. Tins is a structural
problem, not merely a random nstake in democratic output. While it may
be that the subjugated individual can ultimately rally others to his cause, a
political remedy-removal of the rogue adminstrator-will be entirely
ineffectual, as the harm from the retaliation will have been done.
The Court has exercised very sparingly its power to invalidate laws on
the ground that they are animated by an illegitimate purpose. It has done so
to protect the politically powerless from legislative ill will. While
concededly outside the original scope of footnote four of Carolene
Products,347 which concerned historically subjugated and readily identifi-
able minorities, individuals who face alone a campaign of vengeance are
certainly politically powerless in the strictest sense. If the Equal Protection
Clause means anything, it is that a legislature cannot enact laws that
marginalize or subjugate a vulnerable class of citizens merely because a
majority ofthe lawmakers do not like them. Neither shouldrogue executive
officials be permittedto harass or retaliate against an individual out of bare
animus.
Not every random act that disappoints an individual ought to involve
the federal courts in constitutional interpretation. But egregious cases of
governmental oppression are another matter entirely, no matter what the
' See discussion supra Part 11.
35 San Antonio Indep. Seh. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
3 ELY, supra note 175, at 103.
341 See United States v. CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also
supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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race or gender of the victim. Such conduct does not "comport with
traditional ideas of fair play and decency,"34 is "arbitrary" in the constitu-
tional sense, and is thus properly the subject of the equal protection
guarantee.
The cryptic discussion of equal protection in Olech likely will continue
to spawn confusion in the lower courts. In addition to providing some
mediating principle by which to screen equal protection claims, the focus
on egregious, orchestrated retaliation would bring doctrinal parityto "class
of one" cases by re-affirming that only the most outrageous official
misconduct is of constitutional significance. By limiting the "class of one"
theory, the Supreme Court would reaffirm prior precedents like Feeney49
and Wayte, 5 0 which plainly require something more than a bare allegation
of arbitrary conduct. An individual who claims to have been discharged
from employment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause still must
prove that dismissal was due to an intent to discriminate against the
individual because of membership in some group. In addition, claims of
selective prosecution will continue to be limited primarily to challenges
against traditional group-based discrimination or retaliation for exercise of
a constitutional right.3 51 Allegations of arbitrary denial of governmental
benefits will, in the main, be the province of state and local adjudicative
bodies, which will generally be far closer to the disputes and, thus, better
able to resolve them.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the Seventh Circuit conceded in Esmail,352 in rather understated
fashion, protecting angry white males from allegedly unfair government
treatment "is remote from the primary concern of the framers of the equal
protection clause. 353 That observation does not, of course, prohibit an
348 Breithapt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957).
3
9 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1978).
350 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
351 Claims of selective prosecution based on Olech would stand little chance of
success m any event Wayte is grounded upon the broad discretion afforded the
government in determining whom to prosecute. See id. at 607 ("Tlus broad
discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is
particularly ill-suited to judicial review.').
351 Esmail v. Macraue, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).
353 Id. at 180 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879),
and Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,220 (1971)).
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extension of equal protection doctrine, as the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence attests. Prior to Olech, however, the Court was quite careful to limit
the reach of the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit only those governmen-
tal actions based upon impermissible group-identifying characteristics.
Olech brushes aside a century of equal protection jurisprudence, but
provides no useful mediating principle for federal courts to apply As the
Court has emphasized, however, "executive action challenges raise a
particular need to preserve the constitutional proportions of constitutional
clauns." Olech fails to preserve that proportionality. By usurping state
law, the Court's interpretation ofthe Equal Protection Clause demotes not
only the federal constitution, but also the state and local judiciary
Olech signals to all disappointed individuals that they have a constitu-
tional claim against their government officials. The door to the federal
courthouse ought not be opened so wide. Except in the most egregious
cases, individual claims of mistreatment ought to be set to one side under
the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has already fashioned a
mediating principle to limit the scope of the so-called "class of one"
claims. Under the Court's substantive due processjurisprudence, onlythose
executive acts that "shock the conscience" are constitutionally significant
and thus call for a federal remedy. All other cases are the province of state
law Unless Olech is so limited, federal courts will be expounding not a
constitution, but a "font" of administrative law.
3S County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847-48 n.8 (1998).
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